An Examination of Racial Disparities in Bicycle Stops and Citations Made by the Tampa Police Department

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Letter from the Director

Dear colleagues,

In its recommendations, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing underscored the need to build trust with the communities that law enforcement serves, noting that positive community relations support public safety. But allegations or even perceptions of racial disparity in police activities undermine that trust.

To investigate charges that racial profiling was behind the disparate number of police stops of African-American bicycle riders, the Tampa Police Department (TPD) requested assistance from the COPS Office. In response, we worked with the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation and the TPD to conduct in-depth data analysis and interviews with officers and community members. These efforts revealed that though these stops were intended to reduce problems in areas with high crime rates, which were mostly black, the disproportionate citing of African-American bicyclists was unfair and, even if not intended as harassment, often perceived as such. What’s more, the data revealed that the stops did not reduce crime or produce any other positive outcome.

The value of this report is that it highlights the importance of data collection and analysis in evaluating procedures and identifying and correcting problems. Thoroughly assessing a practice through a wide range of data, as well as interviews with all stakeholders, can reveal not only the direct effects of policy decisions but also the impact on the community and unintended consequences of even well-intentioned practices.

I commend former Police Chief Jane Castor for being proactive in addressing the allegations of racial profiling and asking for this review, and I commend current Police Chief Eric Ward and his department for their wholehearted participation in this rigorous assessment and their commitment to change. Efforts of this kind take courage, as well as time and effort.

The challenges facing the TPD are not unique. Indeed, law enforcement agencies throughout the nation must take steps to ensure their activities are evidence-based and do not result in collateral damage such as the disparate enforcement of laws or the unfair treatment of any community.
It is therefore our hope that this report will serve other departments as an example of the importance of data collection and analysis to building trust and legitimacy and in enhancing public safety.

Sincerely,

Ronald L. Davis
Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Acknowledgments

The authors of this report would like to acknowledge the staff of the Tampa Police Department for inviting the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) to conduct this assessment and for their willingness to share experiences and provide insight to our team. This process could not have been completed without the TPD providing us unrestricted and transparent access to its personnel, policies, procedures, and data. In particular, we would like to thank the following individuals for their time and logistical support: Mayor Bob Buckhorn, Chief Eric Ward, Assistant Chief Mary O’Connor, Chief Jane Castor (ret.), Major Richard O’Connor, Major Lee Bercaw, Major Rocky Ratliff, Corporal Kevin Petry, Ms. Ida Walker, Ms. Janelle McGregor, Ms. Kinnette Scallo, Ms. Maryanne Hunsberger, and Ms. Zalavia Brown.

We also wish to thank those Tampa City Council members, community organizations, faith leaders, business community members, and Tampa residents who candidly expressed their views and concerns with us in listening sessions, interviews, phone calls, meetings, and e-mails. Their input contributed greatly to this technical assistance effort.

It is our hope that everyone involved in this process views it and its outcomes as an opportunity for growth—growth in perspective, understanding and community building in Tampa. Throughout this process, we have been encouraged by the TPD’s willingness to consider new strategies to improve procedural justice, enhance public transparency, and enrich service to the citizens of Tampa. Likewise, we have been heartened by the Tampa community’s passion for quality of life and high public safety expectations, as well as its readiness to work hand in hand with the TPD to ensure those expectations are met.

Last, we would like to thank Director Ronald L. Davis, Robert E. Chapman, Matthew C. Scheider, and John H. Kim of the COPS Office for trusting us with providing a critical response technical assistance report to the Tampa Police Department.
Executive Summary

On April 30, 2015, in response to a specific request made by then Police Chief Jane Castor of the Tampa (Florida) Police Department (TPD), the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) announced that it would offer critical response technical assistance to the TPD, including a comprehensive analysis of TPD bicycle law enforcement focusing on bicycle stops and citations.1 The request for assistance was prompted by the April 17, 2015 publication of an article in a local newspaper, the Tampa Bay Times (TBT), concerning racial disparities in TPD bicycle stops and citations.2 This article alleged that the TPD uses minor bicycle violations as a pretext to stop, question, and search bicyclists in high crime, often Black communities as part of the TPD’s proactive policing strategy. In essence, the article alleged that the TPD uses race as a marker of suspicion or racially profiles bicyclists in Tampa in an attempt to suppress crime.

In a demonstration of the city’s commitment to transparency and accountability with the community it serves, Tampa Mayor Bob Buckhorn and Chief Castor opened the TPD’s operations and data to the COPS Office technical assistance team, a comprehensive process that lasted nearly a year. To immediately respond to the community’s concerns following the publication of the TBT article, the TPD implemented new data reporting protocols to improve monitoring of all traffic stops, crime reduction efforts, and strategic decision making in Tampa. Simultaneously, the volume of bicycle stops and citations also decreased.3

To examine racial disparities in the TPD’s bicycle stops, the technical assistance team requested data from the TPD on bicycle stops, bicycle citations, bicycle crashes involving injury, bicycle-related calls for service, and TPD crime maps indicating grid color (a measure of crime in a police area). Our analyses found that the number of Black bicyclists stopped by the TPD greatly exceeded that of White bicyclists. Specifically, between January 1, 2014 and August 30, 2015, Tampa police officers documented 9,121 bicycle stops, 73 percent of them involving Black bicyclists and 26 percent involving White bicyclists.

1 “COPS Office, “U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to Provide Assistance to Tampa Police Department.”
3 Zayas, “Tampa Police Chief Explains Decrease in Bicycle Tickets.”
Given that the population of Tampa is 26 percent Black and 63 percent White, this data, when compared to the overall population of the city, confirms the existence of stark racial disparities in bicycle law enforcement. The TPD offers three race-neutral motivations for the bicycle stops: (1) improving bicycle safety, (2) reducing bicycle theft, and (3) preventing crimes in high crime areas using bicycle stops as part of a proactive policing strategy.

The analyses contained in this report assess the allegation that the TPD racially profiled Black bicyclists, using data concerning both bicycle stops (as documented in street checks) and bicycle citations. At the outset, it is important to note that racial disparity, a race difference on some variable, is not the same as racial discrimination, a racial disparity caused by bias against a particular racial group. There are a multitude of other competing explanations for racial disparities besides racial discrimination. Racial disparities in bicycle stops could be attributable to race differences in such factors as bicycle ridership, when bicycles are used, the manner in which bicycles are ridden, citizen calls for service involving suspects on bicycles, and the demographics of areas where bicycle stops are most heavily used as a form of proactive policing, among many other variables.

The existence of these many competing explanations for the observed racial disparities in bicycle enforcement is a central problem in assessing the allegation that the TPD racially discriminated against Black bicyclists by profiling them. Further, this problem is exacerbated by a lack of valid and reliable data concerning many of the alternative, race-neutral explanations for the observed racial disparities. Simply put, it is difficult to say whether the observed racial disparities are due to racial discrimination by the TPD or to other factors because we lack data to effectively examine all of the alternative explanations.

We use the data obtained from the TPD to assess the extent to which several interrelated factors can account for the observed race differences in bicycle stops. In particular, we assessed whether race differences in bicycle stops can be attributed to race differences in (1) bicycle ridership or manner of riding, using bicycle crashes involving injuries as a proxy variable for these factors (i.e., perhaps race differences in bicycle stops are simply due to race differences in bicycle ridership and manner of riding) and (2) place-based differences in law enforcement practices (i.e., perhaps race differences in bicycle stops are due to the fact that Black people

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4 The available TPD data do not include a Hispanic ethnicity category; as a result, throughout this report Hispanics are categorized by their race (skin color).
5 TPD SOP, section 408.1: “A street check is used to capture information on a person(s) who is not going to be arrested or vehicles associated with suspicious activity, in close proximity to a crime scene, or any other pertinent data that could be used for intelligence gathering.”
6 This report uses citizen to refer to all individuals in a city or town who are not sworn law enforcement officers or government officials. It should not be understood to refer only to U.S. citizens.
ride bicycles in areas where bicycle stops are most prevalent). We then change the focus from bicycle stops to bicycle citations and ask the question: Are Black people more likely to be cited for a bicycle infraction given a bicycle stop than White people?

We find that some but not all of the racial disparities in bicycle stops can be attributed to race differences in bicycle ridership, yet significant racial disparities in bicycle stops persist. Specifically, we compared the race distribution of those involved in bicycle crashes with injuries (as a measure of bicycle ridership and manner of bicycle ridership) to the race distribution of stopped bicyclists. If these two distributions match (i.e., if approximately the same percentage of bicycle crashes and bicycle stops involve Black bicyclists), then the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops are explained. Our results indicate that these two race distributions differ markedly, with the proportion of stopped Black bicyclists exceeding the proportion of Black people involved in bicycle crashes with injury. We found that White people make up 49 percent of bicycle crashes but account for 26 percent of stops, and Black people account for 40 percent of bicycle crashes and 73 percent of stops. Although differences in ridership from the overall population distribution may account for some of the disparities in bicycle stops, significant disparities still remain.

We find racial disparities in bicycle stops are related to place-based differences in bicycle law enforcement. First, bicycle stops occur at substantially higher rates in higher crime areas than lower crime areas. This finding suggests that the TPD used bicycle stops as a crime control tactic. Second, Black bicyclists were at greater risk of being stopped by the TPD in comparison to their proportion of the bicycle-riding population. Taken together, these findings indicate that the focus on high crime areas and the disproportionate focus on Black bicyclists are driving the racial disparity in bicycle stops. To be clear, these findings do not prove that the TPD racially profiled Black bicyclists, yet these data signal a likely source of the disparity.

Among stopped bicyclists, Black bicyclists (5.3 percent) were more likely to receive a formal citation than White bicyclists (3.2 percent). This disparity persisted even after those stopped were statistically matched on place and time. However, after May 1, 2015 when the TPD mandated all bicycle stops be documented as street checks, this disparity disappears.

In addition to examining the disparities in bicycle stops and citations, we also examined the TPD’s three race-neutral rationales for its emphasis on bicycle enforcement. For each of the rationales, we evaluated two questions:

1. Was actual enforcement of bicycle stops consistent with the stated rationale for bicycle stops?

2. Did the TPD’s emphasis on bicycle stops actually achieve the stated goals of each of these rationales (i.e., increased bicycle safety, reduced bicycle theft, and reduced crime generally)?
We addressed the first question by examining the spatial match between where bicycle stops most often occurred and the number of bicycle crashes with injuries (as a measure of bicycle safety), the number of bicycle thefts, and the number of Part I crimes (as a measure of crime problems). If the TPD is strategically using bicycle stops to affect these problems, then bicycle stops should most often occur in the places where these problems are most severe.

We addressed the second question by conducting natural experimental analyses, which capitalized on the precipitous and abrupt drop in bicycle stops after the publication of the TBT article (e.g., bicycle stops dropped by 47 percent after the article’s release). This drop in bicycle stops creates a situation in which the effect of bicycle stops can be estimated or, more precisely, the effect of the reduction in the number of stops on bicycle safety, bicycle theft, and crime generally can be estimated. Specifically, we compared the number of bicycle crashes with injury, the number of bicycle thefts, and the number of Part I crimes reported to the TPD before and after the publication of the TBT article. If bicycle stops achieve the goals stated by the TPD, then this reduction in bicycle stops should cause the number of bicycle crashes, bicycle thefts, and Part I crimes to increase after the publication of the bicycle citation article.

In regard to these two questions, we have several findings. First, the data provided by the TPD do not appear consistent with the agency having a strategic focus on bicycle safety, because there is a mismatch between the places and individuals involved in bicycle stops and those at risk of bicycle injuries. The neighborhoods with the highest number of bicycle crashes are not the ones with the highest number of bicycle stops. Therefore, TPD bicycle enforcement does not appear to be implemented primarily as a means to enhance bicycle safety. Second, the data do not appear consistent with a strategic focus on stolen bicycles. Again there is a mismatch between the places with large numbers of stolen bicycles and the number of bicycle stops. Neighborhoods with higher numbers of reported stolen bicycles have only a slightly higher number of bicycle stops. Third, we found clear evidence that there is a relatively strong relationship between the number of bicycle stops made in an area and crime in that area. Thus, of the three rationales offered by the TPD, only the third rationale, concerning the use of bicycle stops as part of a proactive policing strategy designed to suppress crime, is consistent with the data. Fourth, the recovery of a stolen bicycle is a rare outcome of a bicycle stop. Over a 15-month period, the TPD recovered 19 bicycles as a result of bicycle stops. While returning stolen bicycles to their rightful owners is a laudable goal, one in 280 bicycle stops resulted in this recovery.

7 We examined the spatial match between the number of bicycle stops and the number of bicycle thefts, not the number of recovered stolen bicycles for two reasons. First, it is tautological to justify the number of bicycle stops made in an area based on the number of stolen bikes recovered because the places in which more bicycle stops are made almost by definition will recover more stolen bicycles. Second, very few stolen bicycles were recovered, which severely limits the statistical power of such an analysis.
outcome. Fifth, natural experimental analyses find that the sharp reduction in bicycle stops after the publication of the TBT article had no discernible effect on the number of bicycle crashes with injuries, the number of stolen bicycles, or the number of Part I crimes generally.  

Simply stated, this report finds evidence that the TPD used bicycle enforcement as part of an overall proactive crime reduction strategy rather than through a strategic focus on reducing bicycle thefts or injuries. Proactive policing is a policing strategy that seeks to disrupt criminal activity before it occurs, as opposed to a reactive approach that merely responds to crimes that have already occurred. Proactive policing requires a substantial amount of communication with the general public, key stakeholders, and individuals impacted by proactive policing actions. In addition, proactive policing efforts should rely heavily on the use of data to support and inform the strategy.  

A proactive policing strategy focused on high crime neighborhoods best explains the patterns of bicycle stop data that we observe. Moreover, in interviews with TPD officers at all levels of seniority, we heard that proactive policing is an important component of TPD culture and strategy. During interviews with us, TPD officers provided some anecdotal examples of dangerous offenders apprehended during bicycle stops. Proactive policing can be a legitimate and effective strategy for addressing crime problems in a community.  

Our interviews with TPD officers reveal that these bicycle stops were intended to promote community safety, particularly in areas with the highest crime rates, which were largely Black communities. TPD employees state that they intended for bicycle stops to improve community safety and that bicycle stops were not intended to harass or intimidate Black bicyclists. Our interviews with minority residents in high crime communities indicate that many of those interviewed supported the TPD’s efforts to suppress crime in their community, including their use of bicycle stops. However, other community members suggested there is a perception that what may have begun as an attempt at proactive policing has turned into a way for the police to harass Black bicyclists.  

The TPD’s use of bicycle stops lays bare a fundamental issue in criminal justice—balancing the interests of community crime control against the rights of individuals. We uncovered no evidence that challenges the TPD’s claim that the use of bicycle stops was an earnest effort to reduce crime in high crime, most often Black communities; however, these efforts have disproportionately burdened Black bicyclists. Many of the officers who work in the high crime District 3 told us that they chose to work there because they grew up in District 3 or in neighborhoods similar to those in District 3 and want to make it a safer place. In this context,

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8 We did not analyze the effect of the sharp reduction in bicycle stops on Part II crimes, because Part II crime counts are based on number of arrests, not number of reported crimes. Measuring crime using the number of arrests is potentially problematic, as marked changes in the number of arrests can mean either that police changed tactics or emphasis or that actual crime commission changed.
bicycle stops did not appear to have been made in an effort to discriminate against Black bicyclists; instead, the TPD’s emphasis on bicycling enforcement, by all indications, appears to have been an honest effort to improve community safety in the areas most in need. The bottom-line appears to be that the TPD burdened Black bicyclists by disproportionately stopping them in the name of benefiting Black communities by increasing their public safety. Yet, our analyses indicate that the TPD’s bicycle enforcement did not produce a community benefit in terms of bicycle safety, bicycle theft, or crime generally but did burden individual bicyclists, particularly Black bicyclists in high crime areas of Tampa.

This report is organized as follows: Chapter 1 is an introduction and overview of the report, which discusses the nature, scope, and aims of the technical assistance provided to the TPD. Chapter 2 focuses on assessing and explaining racial disparities in the TPD’s bicycle stops and, secondarily, bicycle citations. Chapter 3 assesses the three race-neutral rationales for aggressive bicycle law enforcement offered by the TPD and examines the effect of bicycle stops on the intended outcomes of bicycle safety, bicycle theft, and overall crime. Chapter 4 briefly summarizes our qualitative findings from interviews and public meetings. The conclusion summarizes this report’s findings and offers several recommendations based on these findings.
1. Introduction and Overview

Critical response technical assistance origins

On April 30, 2015, in response to a specific request made by then Police Chief Jane Castor of the Tampa (Florida) Police Department (TPD), the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) announced that it would offer critical response technical assistance to the TPD, including a comprehensive analysis of TPD stop and ticketing data—in particular, bicycle law enforcement. The request for assistance was prompted by the April 17, 2015 publication of an article in a local newspaper, the Tampa Bay Times (TBT), concerning racial disparities in TPD bicycle stops and citations. This article notes that “in the past three years, Tampa police have written 2,504 bike tickets—more than Jacksonville, Miami, St. Petersburg, and Orlando combined.” And of those ticketed, “eight out of 10 are Black.”

The TBT article also alleged that “Tampa police are targeting poor, Black neighborhoods with obscure subsections of a Florida statue that outlaws things most people have tried on a bike, like riding with no light or carrying a friend on the handlebars. Officers use these minor violations as an excuse to stop, question, and search almost anyone on wheels. The department doesn’t just condone these stops; it encourages them, pushing officers who patrol high crime neighborhoods to do as many as possible (our emphasis).” Further, the article argues: “It’s possible Blacks in some areas use bicycles more than Whites. But that’s not what’s driving the disparity. Police are targeting certain high crime neighborhoods and nitpicking cyclists as a way to curb crime. They hope they will catch someone with a stolen bike or with drugs or that they will scare thieves away.”

The TBT alleges that the use of bicycle stops is part of the TPD’s proactive policing strategy. Specifically, “one personnel file detailed a ‘red grid patrol’ in which officers are encouraged to ‘engage and identify offenders through street checks, bike stops, and traffic stops.’” Moreover, the article notes that in 2007, “a squad set out on a mission dubbed ‘Bicycle Blitzkrieg.’ The goal, according to a department memo, was ‘to aggressively enforce bicycle infractions . . . where there has been increased criminal activity.’”

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9 “COPS Office, “U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to Provide Assistance to Tampa Police Department.”

Notably, the article states that the TPD claims not to use bicycle stops primarily to fight crime. According to the article, a captain in the TPD claimed that bicycle stops are used primarily to improve bicycle safety and to reduce bicycle thefts—not to control crime generally. The article quotes him as saying, “We want to see the thefts of bicycles go down. We want to see the safety get better so there are less crashes . . . . Whether it leads to something else or not is going to be secondary.”

In essence, the article alleges that the TPD racially profiles Black bicyclists, meaning that the racial disparities in bicycle citations are due to racial discrimination by the TPD against Black bicyclists. Yet racial disparity, a race difference on some variable, is not the same as racial discrimination, a racial disparity caused by bias against a particular racial group. There are a multitude of other competing explanations for racial disparities besides racial bias.

The TPD does not deny or dispute the racial disparities reported by the TBT. However, the TPD disagrees with and denies the TBT allegations of racial discrimination against Black bicyclists, offering three key race-neutral motivations for the bicycle stops: improving bicycle safety, reducing bicycle theft, and preventing crimes in high crime areas using bicycle stops as part of a proactive policing strategy.

The purpose of this technical assistance is to analytically evaluate racial disparities in the TPD’s bicycle stops, to examine the validity of the explanations for these disparities, to identify the reasons behind these disparities to the extent possible, and to provide recommendations to address them. To complete this important work, the COPS Office partnered via a cooperative agreement with the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation (VCPI).11

The VCPI assembled a team of statisticians and criminal justice professionals, including Dr. Greg Ridgeway, associate professor of Criminology and Statistics at the University of Pennsylvania; Dr. Ojmarrh Mitchell, associate professor and graduate director in the Department of Criminology at the University of South Florida; Dr. Cedric Alexander, deputy chief operating officer of the DeKalb County Office of Public Safety; and James Letten, assistant dean for Experiential Learning at Tulane Law School.12

This report summarizes the team’s efforts and findings.

11 COPS Office, “U.S. Department of Justice's COPS Office Conducts First Site Visit in Tampa.”
12 For more information about the CRI-TA team, see their biographies on page 67.
Background, scope, limitations, goals, and methodology

Background

To provide some context to this technical assistance effort, we first introduce some background information and statistics on the city of Tampa, its neighborhoods, and its population, as well as the composition and structure of the TPD, which serves them.

While Tampa is part of the larger Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area, the combined population of which is approximately 2.9 million residents, the city of Tampa itself has a population of 346,037 people, according to 2011 U.S. Census data.\(^{13}\)

Located on Florida’s west coast on Tampa Bay near the Gulf of Mexico in Hillsborough County, Tampa’s warm weather allows for nearly year-round access to an array of outdoor activities, including daily bicycling for recreation and transportation purposes.

Covering approximately 112 square miles of land, the city comprises historic districts, business districts, and dozens of residential neighborhoods; however, the six main geographic regions are commonly known as East Tampa, West Tampa, South Tampa, North Tampa, Downtown Tampa, and New Tampa. As of a 2013 departmental report,\(^{14}\) the TPD employed about 950 sworn personnel and 258 civilian personnel to serve Tampa residents in all of these areas and neighborhoods, with TPD sworn personnel being identified as 70 percent White, 14 percent Black, 14 percent Spanish,\(^{15}\) and 2 percent Asian.

TPD Patrol Operations are decentralized to three districts. District 1 serves South Tampa / the Peninsula, West Tampa, and Davis Islands; District 2 serves North Tampa and New Tampa; and District 3 serves East Tampa, Downtown, the Ybor City area, and the Port of Tampa.\(^{16}\)

Overall, the demographic composition of the Tampa population, according to 2010 U.S. Census data, is 62.9 percent White or Caucasian (including White Hispanic), 26.2 percent Black or African American, 3.4 percent Asian, 0.4 percent Native American or Native Alaskan, 0.1 percent Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian, and 3.2 percent multiracial (two or more races).\(^{17}\)

However, demographics vary substantially across the city’s main areas and neighborhoods.

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\(^{13}\) U.S. Census Bureau, “Texas Dominates List of Fastest Growing Large Cities.”

\(^{14}\) Tampa Police Department, 2013 Tampa Statistics.

\(^{15}\) “Spanish” is the term used in TPD reports for what the census would label as Hispanic.

\(^{16}\) Tampa Police Department, “TPD Patrol District 1–3.”

\(^{17}\) U.S. Census Bureau, “QuickFacts: Tampa city, Florida.”
For instance, East Tampa, the area served by the TPD’s District 3, is 84 percent Black and 10 percent White. North Tampa, the area served by the TPD’s District 2, is 50 percent Black and 39 percent White. South Tampa and West Tampa, the areas served by the TPD’s District 1, are approximately 74 percent White (including White Hispanic) and 11 percent Black.

Overall, crime in Tampa has dropped markedly and consistently over the past 10 years. In fact, between January 2005 and October 2015, Part 1 crime in Tampa dropped by more than 50 percent, from a monthly average of 1,536 incidents in 2005 to 653 in 2015.\(^\text{18}\) The largest reductions in crime came relatively early in this time period, while in recent years the pace slowed. Notably, the number of Part 1 crimes does not vary greatly across the three TPD districts. For example, in 2014, the last full data year, the monthly average numbers of Part 1 crimes in the three districts were 243, 229, and 207 for Districts 1, 2, and 3, respectively; however, the greater number of residents in Districts 1 and 2 translates to District 3 having a higher crime rate than the other districts. (We do not have precise estimates of the number of residents in each district.) Crime patterns vary substantially by district, with District 1 (West Tampa) having a greater number of property crimes, particularly theft, than the other districts; District 3 (East Tampa) having a greater number of violent crimes (e.g., aggravated assault, murder); and District 2 (North Tampa) falling in between the other districts on most Part 1 crimes, with the exception of burglary, which was higher in District 2 than the other districts.

Within each of the three patrol districts, TPD patrol, investigative, and neighborhood liaison personnel are assigned to specific geographic areas, or zones, in which they are tasked with building and maintaining “zondership,” or thorough knowledge of crime patterns, quality of life issues, problem locations, repeat offenders, victims, and community stakeholders in the neighborhoods within their zones. The zones often correspond with (but may be smaller than) the 239 grids into which the city is currently divided. TPD patrol operations are driven by both calls for service and proactive efforts within the grids and zones.

In an effort to deliver police services tailored to the specific and unique public safety needs of each of the city’s police districts and neighborhoods, the TPD uses Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data on Part 1 Offenses to assign a color-coded designation to each grid. Part 1 Offenses include the most serious crimes: criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.\(^\text{19}\) The TPD’s color-coding grid designations are as follows: a red grid is a geographic area with 120 or more Part 1 Offenses per

\(^{18}\) We focus on number of Part I crimes instead of the rate of Part I crimes, because we do not have accurate population counts for each police district. Part I crimes include homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

year; an orange grid is a geographic area with 84 to 119 Part 1 Offenses per year; a yellow grid is a geographic area with 48 to 83 Part 1 Offenses per year; and an unmarked grid is a geographic area with zero to 47 Part 1 Offenses per year.

Scope and limitations

The scope of this technical assistance includes analyses of both quantitative TPD enforcement and crime data and qualitative data assessing both TPD and community perceptions of the TPD’s bicycle law enforcement specifically and overall police-community relationships generally. The team evaluated racial disparities in the TPD’s bicycle stops and bicycle citations primarily between January 1, 2014 and August 15, 2015 and assessed the reasons offered by the TPD as justifications for the practice, using TPD data on bicycle stops, bicycle citations, bicycle crashes involving injury, bicycle-related calls for service, and TPD crime maps indicating grid color (a measure of crime in a police area).

The data used in this report are administrative data collected by the TPD for the police department’s own use. The data obtained from the TPD have several significant shortcomings that need to be noted. First, before May 1, 2015, the TPD did not require officers to record every bicycle stop as a street check. Officers recorded bicycle stops at their discretion. Thus, there is an unknown and unknowable amount of missing data concerning bicycle stops. Second, the available bicycle stop data are limited by their brevity—there is no detailed description of the behavior that motivated the officer to make each stop. Having such data would be instrumental in identifying the factors motivating officers to make bicycle stops, and such data potentially would help us to estimate more accurately the effect of race in the decision to make a bicycle stop. Third, many factors that interest us as researchers are beyond the scope of the TPD’s interest. For example, we would like to have data on the racial composition of bicycle riders in Tampa broken down by area (e.g., police grid or police district). Understandably, the TPD does not collect such data, as such data are not highly relevant to their work. Likewise, the TPD does not record data on the bicycle riding patterns of bicyclists in Tampa by race, such as when bicycles are ridden (time of day), purpose of bicycle riding (transportation, pleasure, or exercise), manner of bicycle riding (safe or dangerous), and so forth. Having such data would allow us to examine whether these factors can explain the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops.

Data limitations complicate our examination of racial disparities in bicycle enforcement in Tampa, yet these data are useful in addressing many of the issues central to this report. The data provided by the TPD permit us to examine the key claim made by the TBT article (i.e., that the TPD uses bicycle stops in high crime areas in a racially biased manner in an effort to control crime) as well as examine the TPD’s alternative explanations for the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops. Further, we obtained much more data than was available to the TBT; for example, we obtained data not only on bicycle citations (the focus of the TBT article) but also on bicycle stops; bicycle crashes with injuries; calls for service involving bicyclists; bicycle thefts; bicycles
recovered by the TPD; Part 1 crime data; and qualitative interview data with the TPD, advocacy
groups, and community members. The breadth of these data and the breadth of our analyses
allow us to gain a much broader view of the TPD’s use of bicycle stops and the role race played
in these stops than was put forth by the TBT article.

The team also requested data on all vehicle traffic stops to determine if the pattern of bicycle
stops applied to traffic stops as well. However, before 2015, only stops leading to citations were
regularly documented. Starting in 2015, the TPD began phasing in the documentation of all
vehicle traffic stops, and the rollout was not complete at the time of the data request. Any
analysis of racial disparities in traffic stops will need to occur at least six months after the rollout
is complete to allow for data on the traffic stops to accumulate. As a result, we did not pursue
an analysis of racial disparities in vehicle stops.

It is important to note that analysis of racial profiling is more feasible with complete data on all
vehicle stops, including an identifier of the officer who made the stop, date and time of the stop,
location of the stop, reason for the stop, and stop outcomes (e.g., length of stop or search or
contraband recovery). With such data, three key analyses become possible, as described in a
study of Cincinnati Police Department traffic stops.20 First, we can contrast the race of vehicle
drivers during daylight hours (when a driver’s race is more visible) with the race of drivers after
dark (when a driver’s race is less visible). This approach has been adopted in numerous cities,
including Cincinnati and San Diego, as well as in statewide analyses, including Connecticut.
Second, we can benchmark the race distribution of each officer’s stops by using the race of
drivers stopped by other officers patrolling at the same time, place, and context. This approach
can assess whether certain officers have unusually disparate stop patterns relative to their
peers. This approach has been used in several cities, including New York City. Last, we could
assess the racial gap in stop outcomes, such as search rates and average length of the stop, by
comparing the stops of Black drivers to stops of White drivers occurring at the same time and
place and for the same reasons. If the TPD continues to collect rich data on vehicle stops, then
sufficient data for this racial profiling analysis would be possible by fall 2016.

The ideal means of assessing whether there is racial bias in bicycle stops and citations in Tampa
would be to conduct an audit study. Audit studies involved the use of “testers” of different
races. These testers would be trained to ride their bicycles through Tampa in a standardized
manner. This would increase confidence that the only meaningful difference between the
testers was their race. Then, depending on whether the testers experienced differences by race
in the rates of bicycle stops or bicycle citations, this would be powerful evidence for or against

20 Ridgeway, Cincinnati Police Department Traffic Stops.
racial bias in bicycle stops or bicycle citations by the TPD. While we cannot conduct such an audit study retrospectively in the time period of the alleged racial profiling as noted in the TBT article, one could conceivably conduct an audit study in the future, though it would be time consuming and costly.

Last, because of the nature of the allegations made in the TBT article, during the course of this technical assistance inquiry various citizens and organizations have, at times, called for a formal investigation of the TPD by the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division in order to determine whether the practices that have been the focus of this study warrant further action by the Federal Government. Although the team conducting this work did so as part of an engagement by and with the COPS Office, the ultimate decision to conduct any investigation rests with the Civil Rights Division. This is not such an investigation or inquiry, and any recommendation on this potential action is beyond the purview of this review.

The issues, challenges, and any subsequent recommendations identified through this effort—although unique to Tampa—may be applicable to other agencies and the communities they serve throughout the United States.

Technical assistance goals and methodology

Together, the analyses included in this report assess the allegation that the racial disparity in the TPD’s bicycle law enforcement is due to racial discrimination. The TPD acknowledges that the disparity exists, and our initial analyses confirmed it. Therefore, our efforts center upon understanding the underlying conditions that gave rise to this disparity and exploring whether the TPD’s actions were racially motivated. As such, the following interrelated goals guided our work:

Goal 1. Confirm or refute the racial disparity in bicycle citations.

Goal 2. Determine the nature, extent, and scope of the TPD bicycle stops and ticketing procedures (i.e., was the practice pretextual; was it motivated to enhance traffic safety, reduce bicycle theft, prevent or reduce crime, or a combination of reasons; was it racially motivated or a race-neutral, anti-crime, public safety measure?).

Goal 3. Determine, to the extent possible, why racial disparities exist in the planning, execution, or (intended or unintended) results of the bicycle stops and ticketing procedures.

21 Richardson, “ACLU Calls for Stop.”
Goal 4. Further augment any findings and conclusions, if necessary, with recommendations aimed at eliminating any real or perceived disparities, unfairness, or perceptions.

Goal 5. Provide a framework and options for both the TPD and the community to achieve and enhance public safety, quality of life, and public trust through crime reduction, while simultaneously eliminating or significantly minimizing unfair or negative consequences or effects.

In order to achieve these goals, the team conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses of available information. Analytical conclusions were considered in tandem with the perceptions, opinions, and attitudes within the TPD, the Tampa community as a whole, and the primarily Black communities most directly affected by the subject of this study.

Quantitative analyses

To help inform the quantitative analysis, the team collected, analyzed, and assessed TPD and related publicly available data (statistics) to examine and determine, to the extent possible, the following:

- Why racial disparities exist in TPD bicycle law enforcement practices
- The alignment of enforcement activities with other department crime strategies, such as enhanced enforcement in Tampa’s high crime areas (red grids)
- The effectiveness of bicycle stops in attempting to reduce crime, promote safety, and reduce theft of bicycles
- The extent to which TPD officers have complied with the department’s stated policy of enhancing the safety of bicycle riders and pedestrians by defaulting to the educational approach for the preponderance of stops, giving warnings before issuing citations

Qualitative analyses

To help inform the quantitative analysis, the team also collected and analyzed information received through the following means:

Interviews. The team conducted, variously, more than 75 interviews. These were conducted either remotely via telephone or on-site in Tampa in one-on-one or very small group sessions (including in ride-along or police roll call scenarios). Those interviewed include law enforcement officers, department supervisors, and community representatives.

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22 Bicycle theft is considered a rampant problem in Tampa, with bicycles accounting for 17 percent of all theft and being the most often stolen item in the city. See Logan, “Bike Thefts Becoming Rampant.”

23 See TPD SOP 635.V.B.1, which states, “Warnings should be given in most cases. Citations should be given for flagrant violations.”
officers (including patrolmen and senior management officials), elected officials (including council persons), media representatives, community members, community organizations and their representatives, community leaders, clergy, and other community stakeholders.

**Community listening session.** The team organized, facilitated, and provided a publicly advertised, unrestricted opportunity for members of the community—in an open, public venue accessible to the press—to provide anecdotal evidence or information or to voice concerns or other useful information regarding the bicycle stop and citation issue.\(^{24}\) The event was conducted at the Hillsborough Community College’s Ybor Campus on the evening of July 14, 2015, drawing approximately 150 attendees, some 45 of whom offered oral or written comment.\(^{25}\)

**Anonymous community feedback opportunities.** The team established a web-based portal providing an anonymous avenue for community feedback, opinions, and information. The portal was advertised locally via various city and community organizations, the media, etc., and was made available from July through November 2015. Approximately 250 responses were generated.

**Document review.** The team reviewed, studied, and analyzed documents such as TPD standard operating procedures (SOPs); department organizational structure; bicycle safety, light, and registration efforts; resource allocation and deployments in support of goals; annual reports; social media use; and community outreach and engagement efforts.

**Media content analysis.** The team reviewed and analyzed media and social media exposure surrounding the issue in order to gauge and determine public perspective.

**Literature review.** The team conducted a study and synthesis of DOJ reports, industry and academic research, case law, and national best practices, as well as national and state of Florida bicycle and pedestrian safety reports and plans.

**Miscellaneous personal contact.** The team maintained various e-mail and telephonic contact throughout the duration of the technical assistance with community members and stakeholders.

This report focuses on the quantitative analysis of TPD data on bicycle stops. We have woven the qualitative information gathered from interviews and documents into our presentation of our analyses.

\(^{24}\) Although there were no restrictions placed on the subject matter of the public’s expressed concerns, there was a time limit established for each speaker in order to allow for as many speakers as possible.

\(^{25}\) Dawson, “Feds Get Earful at Meeting.”
2. TPD Bicycle Stops: Racial Disparity or Racial Profiling?

Assessing allegations of racial profiling

In essence, the TBT article, which precipitated this technical assistance, alleges that the TPD racially profiles Black bicyclists, meaning that the racial disparities in bicycle citations are due to racial discrimination by the TPD against Black bicyclists. In particular, the article suggests that the TPD’s use of bicycle stops as a proactive, crime fighting strategy is applied in a racially biased manner. Additionally, the TBT states that the TPD uses minor and common bicycle violations as a pretext to stop suspicious individuals—most of whom are Black—in the name of crime prevention.

The TPD knows that there are racial disparities in bicycle citations when compared to the demographics of the city. However, the TPD disagrees with the allegation of racial discrimination against Black bicyclists (i.e., racial profiling). The TPD offers three key race-neutral motivations for bicycle stops: improving bicycle safety, reducing bicycle theft, and preventing crimes in high crime areas using bicycle stops as part of a proactive policing strategy.

The analyses below assess the allegation that the TPD racially profiles Black bicyclists using data concerning both bicycle stops as documented in street checks and bicycle citations. At the outset, it is important to note that racial disparity, a difference by race in some outcome, is not the same as racial discrimination, a racial disparity caused by bias against a particular racial group. There are a multitude of other competing explanations for racial disparities besides racial bias. In this specific case, the observed racial disparities in TPD bicycle stops and bicycle citations may be because of factors such as

- racial differences in bicycle usage—Black people may be more likely than White people to ride bicycles as a means of transportation (while White people may be more likely than Black people to ride bicycles as a form of recreation or exercise);

- racial differences in when bicycles are used—Black people may be more likely than White people to ride bicycles at night (when the use of lights is required by law);

- racial differences in the manner in which bicycles are ridden—Black bicyclists may be more likely than White bicyclists to engage in dangerous bicycling behaviors such as riding through traffic and riding with passengers on the handlebars;
• racial differences in citizen calls for service—citizens may call the police to report incidents of criminal behavior from Black bicyclists more often than from White bicyclists;

• racial differences in residence patterns—Black bicyclists may be more likely than White bicyclists to be stopped because they live in (or ride through) high crime communities where the TPD is more likely to use bicycle stops as a form of proactive policing.

These are only the most obvious potential explanations of the observed racial disparities that do not involve racial bias (racial profiling); there are surely many others. The number of potential competing explanations for the observed racial disparities in TPD bicycle stops and citations makes reaching a definitive conclusion about the actual source of these racial disparities exceedingly difficult. Simply put, it is difficult to say whether the observed racial disparities are due to racial discrimination by the TPD or other factors because we lack data to effectively examine all of the alternative explanations. For instance, to our knowledge there is no reliable and valid data concerning the racial distribution of bicycle riders in Tampa, racial differences in when bicycles are ridden, and racial differences in the manner of riding. Without data measuring these competing explanations, we either have no means of assessing these potential explanations, or we are forced to use proxy variables to assess these explanations.

The proxy variable we have chosen for our analysis is the racial distribution of bicycle riders involved in bicycle crashes in Tampa. Information on bicyclists involved in crashes should help us to understand the racial distribution of bicycle riders, the places in which they ride, and how safely or unsafely they ride. Because the TPD has indicated that bicycle safety is a primary motivation for bicycle stops, data on bicycle crashes conveniently take into account potential racial differences in the manner (dangerousness) of riding.

Using bicycle crashes as a proxy variable, we can either tentatively confirm or eliminate these explanations for the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops and bicycle citations. For example, if the bicycle crash data indicates that Black bicyclists are disproportionately involved in crashes involving bicycles, then this would suggest that the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops and bicycle citations arise from Black bicyclists in Tampa being more likely to ride bicycles as a means of transportation or in an unsafe manner than White bicyclists in Tampa. On the other hand, if the bicycle crash data reveal that Black bicyclists are no more likely or only a little more likely than White bicyclists to be involved in a crash, then this would indicate that the racial disparity in bicycle stops and bicycle citations cannot be explained by race differences in bicycle ridership or the manner of bicycle riding. In short, whenever data or a proxy variable is available, we can use such data to tentatively confirm or disconfirm competing explanations.
More problematic is the fact that some potential explanations do not have data or a proxy variable available (e.g., racial differences in when bicycles are used); therefore, we cannot eliminate these potential explanations as an alternative to the racial profiling (discrimination) explanation. Stated differently, the analyses reported in this document are incapable of ruling out all potential alternative explanations to the racial profiling explanation offered by the TBT. At best, we can confirm or eliminate some explanations based on the available data.

**Data**

To assess the allegation that the TPD racially profiles Black bicyclists, we requested data from the TPD pertaining to bicycle stops (when and where they occurred), bicycle citations (when and where they occurred), bicycle crashes involving injury (when and where they occurred), bicycle-related calls for service, and TPD crime maps indicating grid color (a measure of crime in a police area). Table 1 summarizes the data that we received.

**Table 1. Summary of data sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bicycle stops</strong></td>
<td>Date and location of stop, reason for stop, race and sex of person stopped, whether officer issued a bicycle light, whether officer registered bicycle, whether bicyclist received a warning or citation. After May 2015, TPD mandated street check documentation of all bicycle stops.</td>
<td>January 1, 2014 – August 30, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(street checks)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stolen bicycles</strong></td>
<td>Contains data on the date and place of bicycles reported stolen.</td>
<td>January 1, 2013 – August 31, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thematic map Part I crimes 2014</strong></td>
<td>Map of TPD neighborhood grids marking them by the number of Part I Offenses in a year. Seven are marked red (more than 120 offenses), 21 marked orange (84 to 119 offenses), and 56 are marked yellow (48 to 83 offenses). The remaining 155 are unmarked.</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bicycle crashes</strong></td>
<td>Contains data on all bicycle accidents resulting in injuries that were reported to the police. Includes date, grid number, and race of bicyclist.</td>
<td>January 1, 2013 – December 17, 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analyses

We analyzed the data obtained from the TPD to address many interrelated questions. First and as a point of departure, we assess the extent of racial disparities in bicycle stops. This is an important first step, as the TBT article examined racial disparities in bicycle citations, which are a small subset of all bicycle stops. After having documented substantial racial disparities in bicycle stops, we assess the extent to which the following factors can account for the observed race differences in bicycle stops: (1) race differences in bicycle ridership and manner of bicycle riding using bicycle crashes as a proxy variable for these factors; (2) place-based differences in law enforcement practices; and (3) differences in law enforcement practices across grid colors. Last, we change the focus from bicycle stops to bicycle citations and ask the question: Are Black bicyclists more likely to be cited for a bicycle infraction, given a bicycle stop, than White bicyclists?

Describing racial disparities in bicycle stops

The bicycle stop data as documented by TPD street checks clearly demonstrate stark racial disparities in bicycle stops when compared to the population demographic of the city of Tampa (see table 2). In the full period of observation (January 2014 to August 2015), 73.2 percent of stopped bicyclists were Black, which is nearly three times as large as the percentage of stopped bicyclists who were White (25.9 percent). The same pattern of racial disparities in bicycle stops is apparent in each data year and even after the publication of the TBT article alleging racial profiling. Thus, the racial disparities noted in the TBT article concerning bicycle citations are also apparent in bicycle stops, and these racial disparities are relatively stable over the approximately two-year period of interest.

Table 2. Race distribution of bicyclists stopped by the TPD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>2014 (%)</th>
<th>2015 (%)</th>
<th>After TBT story (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>9,121</td>
<td>6,056</td>
<td>3,065</td>
<td>1,433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the observed racial disparities do not vary substantially over time, there is considerable variation by place. Table 3 displays the percentage of stopped bicycles of each racial group by TPD district.

In District 1, the percentage of bicyclists stopped who were White (49.6 percent) exceeded the percentage who were Black (48.8 percent). However, in Districts 2 and 3, the Black percentage of stopped bicyclists greatly exceeds the White percentage. In District 3, the district that had the largest number of bicycle stops, the Black percentage of stopped bicyclists is 80.4 percent compared to 18.9 percent for White people. This latter finding is particularly notable, as District 3 has the largest Black population, whereas District 1 has the smallest Black population. According to the 2010 U.S. Census data, East Tampa, the area served by the TPD’s District 3, is 84 percent Black and 10 percent White. West Tampa, the area served by the TPD’s District 1, is approximately 74 percent White and 11 percent Black.

Thus, part of the racial disparity in bicycle stops is related to racial differences in place of residence. These findings clearly illustrate that place plays a prominent role in the likelihood of a bicycle stop; therefore, our analyses need to take place into account. Therefore, we first sought to evaluate if racial disparities in bicycle stops can be explained by race differences in bicycle ridership, while taking place into account.

Table 3. Race distribution of stopped bicyclists by TPD district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>District 1 (%)</th>
<th>District 2 (%)</th>
<th>District 3 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>3,057</td>
<td>4,378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Are the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops explained by race differences in bicycle ridership using bicycle crashes as a benchmark?

While we do not have valid and reliable data concerning the racial distribution of bicycle riders or how carefully they ride their bicycles, we can use those involved in bicycle crashes as a benchmark for these factors. To do so, we obtained data from 2013 to 2015 on all bicycle crashes reported to the police in which someone was injured. These data are useful because they approximate the bicycling frequency and crash risk of bicyclists by race. If the race distribution of those involved in bicycle crashes closely matches the race distribution of bicycle stops, then this would be strong evidence that the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops are simply due to race differences in bicycle ridership and the manner in which bicycles are ridden. Yet table 4 clearly shows that the two distributions are highly dissimilar. In stark contrast to the race distribution of bicycle stops, a larger percentage of those involved in bicycle crashes with injury were White (48.6 percent) than Black (39.7 percent). Furthermore, the percentage of Black bicyclists among those injured in crashes is well below their representation in the street checks.

Table 4. Race distribution of bicyclists stopped by the TPD compared with bicyclists involved in accidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race distribution of stopped bicyclists (%)</th>
<th>Race distribution of those involved in bicycle crashes with injuries (%)</th>
<th>Race distribution of those involved in bicycle crashes with injuries adjusted to match where bicycle stops occur (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 A similar methodology was employed in Alpert, Dunham, and Smith, “Investigating Racial Profiling.” These authors used not-at-fault automobile accidents as a benchmark in a study of racial profiling of drivers.
As previously noted, part of the racial disparity in bicycle stops is related to differences in location. Black people are more likely to live in areas of Tampa, like District 3, where bicycle stops are numerous, and White people are more likely to live in areas where bicycle stops are much less common. Figure 1 shows (in solid gray) the grids (the TPD’s neighborhood area designation) with the highest frequency of bicycle crashes. The figure also shows (with diagonal lines) the grids with the highest frequency of bicycle stops. There are three grids with a high number of bicycle crashes and bicycle stops. However, most of the grids with a high number of bicycle crashes do not have a high number of bicycle stops (shown with both gray shading and diagonal lines). There is a spatial mismatch between where the crashes are occurring and where the bicycle stops are occurring. So it is plausible that the difference in the racial distribution of stops shown in the third and fourth columns in table 4 is due to differences between where bicyclists crash and where stops occur.

Figure 1. Tampa grids with a large number of bicycle crashes and grids with a large number of bicycle stops

Note: For analysis and illustration purposes, we chose to highlight roughly the top 20 city grids in terms of bicycle crash volume. That cutoff was at 9 crashes, which generated a total of 18 grids, which are displayed in figure 1.
To account for these differences in location, we used the TPD grid of each bicycle crash and reweighted\textsuperscript{27} the bicycle crash data so that the frequency of bicycle crashes in a grid matched the number of bicycle stops in the grid, effectively eliminating location as a plausible explanation for the difference. Even after adjusting for the location of the stops, Black bicyclists are overrepresented by nearly 20 percentage points when compared to their representation in bicycle crashes in the same neighborhoods; Black bicyclists make up 73 percent of bicycle stops but 55 percent of bicycle crashes.

Simply stated, these findings clearly indicate that the racial disparities in bicycle stops are unlikely to be attributable to race differences in the frequency of bicycle ridership or the manner of ridership. Yet, the question remains: Why are Black people overrepresented among those stopped? If race bias is not involved in the decision to conduct bicycle stops, then the racial disparity we observe must result from police officers focusing their bicycle enforcement efforts in neighborhoods with high percentages of Black residents; identifying some feature of the bicyclist that warrants a stop, such as suspicious behavior; or responding to a report from the public.

**Are the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops explained by place-based differences in bicycling enforcement?**

The analyses reported in the previous section adjust for place-based differences in the likelihood of a bicycle stop by using weights. Adjusting for place-based differences is very important because there are clear and stark differences in the likelihood of a bicycle stop by place. This observations leads to the possibility that racial disparities in bicycle stops are in part explained by place-based differences in bicycle enforcement. To investigate this possibility, we examined the rate of bicycle stops by grid color and racial disparities in bicycle stops by grid color.

Figure 2 on page 25 reports the rate of bicycle stops per grid by grid color. For example, there were a total of 2,223 bicycle stops made in the 128 unmarked, low crime grids, for a rate of 17.4 bicycle stops per grid. It clearly shows that the frequency of bicycle stops is considerably larger in high crime grids (orange and red grids) than in low crime grids (unmarked and yellow grids). This finding indicates that the TPD focuses its bicycle stop efforts in high crime areas of the city. The section “Rationale 3. Bicycle law enforcement is part of a proactive crime prevention strategy in high crime areas” on page 41 contains a more in-depth description of red, orange, and yellow grids.

\textsuperscript{27} This reweighting is the same process used in standard reweighting of samples to make them represent a population. The observation weight for a bicycle crash in grid X is equal to the number of street checks in grid X divided by the number of bicycle crashes in grid X.
Further, racial disparities in bicycle stops are somewhat more pronounced in high crime grids. Table 5 on page 26 focuses on the differences between the second two columns, which respectively report the raw percentage of bicycle stops involving Black bicyclists and this percentage adjusted as before to match the locations where bicycle stops occur. For each grid color, Black bicyclists were stopped at rates considerably higher than the percentage of bicycle crashes involving Black cyclists. The disparity persists at all crime levels.

The findings reported in figure 2 demonstrate that bicycle stops are used most often in high crime areas, a finding that again suggests the TPD uses bicycle stops as a crime control tactic. Further, table 5 demonstrates that the percentage of Black bicyclists stopped in each grid color is beyond what we would expect if the TPD was focused primarily on bicycle safety. These patterns are consistent with a pattern of using bicycling violations in order to stop bicyclists in high crime areas, with the goal of controlling crime. To be clear, these findings do not prove that the TPD racially profiled Black bicyclists but show a pattern of enforcement that disproportionately affects Black bicyclists.
Table 5. Overrepresentation of Black bicyclists by grid color

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grid color</th>
<th>Black bicyclists as a proportion of bicycle stops</th>
<th>Black bicyclists as a proportion of bicycle crashes (location adjusted)</th>
<th>Percentage point difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are Blacks more likely to be cited for bicycle infractions given a bicycle stop?

Last, the TPD explained that bicyclists were more often issued warnings than citations. Therefore, we sought to focus on racial differences in the proportion of those stopped who received a citation, a more punitive outcome, instead of a warning, a less punitive outcome. Specifically, our aim is to assess, after accounting for differences in when and where stops occur, whether we still find a disparity in citation rates for Black bicyclists. While officers may have different rates of citing bicyclists they stop, and the stops may occur at different times and places, officers should be issuing citations in a race-neutral manner.

The data on street checks provide little information about the outcomes of each stop. Warnings and citations were by far the most commonly reported outcomes, together accounting for 90 percent of stops. Some of those stops also included other outcomes such as bicycle registration or the distribution of a bicycle light.

The analysis is complicated by the fact that prior to May 2015, documentation of bicycle stops was not mandatory. Therefore, observed differences could be due to officers selecting to document some stops but not others. To address this possibility, we conducted an analysis on all documented stops from January 1, 2014 through August 30, 2015 and then repeated the analysis using only stops made after May 1, 2015.

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28 TPD SOP, section 408.1: “A street check is used to capture information on a person(s) who is not going to be arrested or vehicles associated with suspicious activity, in close proximity to a crime scene, or any other pertinent data that could be used for intelligence gathering.”
At first look, Black bicyclists received citations more frequently than White bicyclists, in 5.3 percent of stops compared with 3.2 percent. However, the data indicate that Black and White bicyclists are being stopped in different times and different Tampa neighborhoods. For example, 13 percent of stops of Black bicyclists and 17 percent of stops of White bicyclists occurred in July. Also, 5.2 percent of stops of Black bicyclists occurred in grid 39 (the neighborhood around East Sitka Street), while the TPD stopped only 2.3 percent of White bicyclists there.

During the study period, there were 6,043 documented stops involving Black bicyclists. We used a statistical matching technique\(^\text{29}\) to locate 641 records of White bicyclists whose stops resembled the stops of Black bicyclists, matching on year, month, day of the week, location of the stop, and the percentage of bicyclists who had had a previous bicycle stop.

These 641 bicyclists comprise only one-third of all White bicyclists whom the TPD stopped. However, it is this collection of White bicyclists that is most informative about racial differences in citation rates, because they were stopped in similar places and days as the stopped Black bicyclists. Time of day is not recorded in the street check data, so some differences that we cannot observe might remain.

Even after adjusting for time and place of the stops, we still find that the percentage of Black bicyclists receiving citations exceeds that of White bicyclists. In fact, the percentage of Black and White stopped bicyclists receiving a citation is nearly identical to the unadjusted percentages—5.3 percent of stopped Black bicyclists received citations, and 2.7 percent of matched White bicyclists received citations (see figure 3 on page 28). This difference does not persist after May 2015. After May 2015, the TPD issued citations to 6.0 percent of stopped Black bicyclists and 6.1 percent of similarly situated stopped White bicyclists. It is unclear whether officers have changed their citation practices or have altered their documentation practices since May 2015.

These findings indicate that stopped bicyclists who were Black received citations at a higher rate than stopped bicyclists who were White—even after matching on several relevant factors. Yet this difference disappeared after May 1, 2015, when the TPD changed its rules regarding the documentation of bicycle stops (street checks).

\(^{29}\) We used propensity score weighing, where the propensity scores were estimated using a boosted logistic regression model as described in Ridgeway, “Assessing the Effect of Race Bias.”
Findings regarding racial disparities

Our analyses of TPD data on racial disparities yield the following findings:

**Finding 1.** There are large racial disparities in bicycle stops. In the period of observation (January 2014 to August 2015), 73.2 percent of stopped bicyclists were Black, while 25.9 percent were White. The magnitude of this racial disparity is relatively stable throughout this time period but varies considerably by TPD district.

**Finding 2.** The observed racial disparities are not attributable to differences in bicycle ridership or manner of bicycle riding, as assessed using the bicycle crash benchmark. In comparison to the proportion of those involved in a bicycle crash with injuries—a proxy for the race distribution of bicyclists in Tampa as well as a proxy of dangerousness of riding—Black bicyclists were disproportionately stopped by the TPD.

**Finding 3.** The rate of bicycle stops is considerably higher in areas (grids) with relatively high levels of crime than in areas with lower levels of crime. In particular, the rates of bicycle stops were substantially higher in orange and red grids than yellow and unmarked grids.

**Finding 4.** Among stopped bicyclists, Black bicyclists (5.3 percent) were more likely to receive a formal citation than White bicyclists (3.2 percent). This disparity persisted even after those stopped were statistically matched on place and time. However, after May 1, 2015 when the TPD mandated all bicycle stops be documented as street checks, this disparity disappears.
Finding 5. The data available from the TPD have several limitations, including limited dates of availability and lack of documentation on all street checks and bicycle stops prior to May 1, 2015. These limitations hampered the research team’s ability to prove or disprove the allegation of racial profiling. As a result, it is possible that the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops and citations are attributable to factors not included in the data provided to the research team.

Finding 6. During the study period, the TPD did not have a policy of documenting all bicycle and traffic stops. The TPD has begun phasing in the documentation of all vehicle traffic stops.

Finding 7. The data suggest that the TPD uses bicycle stops in an effort to reduce crime generally in high crime areas. This is consistent with a pattern of using bicycling violations as a method to deter and investigate potential criminal activity. Bicycle enforcement in these areas will disproportionately impact Black residents.
3. TPD Bicycle Stops:  
Three Enforcement Rationales

The TBT reported that the TPD writes more bicycle citations than Jacksonville, Miami, St. Petersburg, and Orlando combined. This difference, however, is largely due to those other Florida cities simply not writing bicycle citations. For example, in 2014, the TPD issued 536 citations, Jacksonville issued one citation, Miami issued 138, St. Petersburg issued 176, and Orlando issued 86. While there are numerous possible reasons for these differences, such as lower levels of bicycle usage, it is clear that compared to their peers in Florida, the TPD views bicycle citations as more important to their community’s public safety.

The TPD offers three primary race-neutral rationales as to why it emphasizes bicycle law enforcement:

1. Bicycle law enforcement improves bicycle safety.
2. Bicycle law enforcement reduces bicycle theft.
3. Bicycle law enforcement is part of a proactive crime prevention strategy in high crime areas, which is effective in reducing crime.

In this chapter of this report, we examine the TPD’s stated rationales for its heavy emphasis on bicycle stops. For each rationale, we evaluate two questions:

1. Was the actual enforcement of bicycle stops consistent with the stated rationale for bicycle stops?
2. Did TPD’s emphasis on bicycle stops actually achieve the stated goals of each of these rationales (i.e., increased bicycle safety, reduced bicycle theft, reduced crime generally)?

To address the first question, we examined the spatial match between the number of bicycle stops in an area and the number of bicycle crashes with injuries (as a measure of bicycle safety), the number of bicycle thefts, and the number of Part I crimes (as a measure of crime problems). In essence, if the TPD is strategically using bicycle stops to achieve greater bicycle safety, then bicycle stops should take place where bicycle crashes are most common. Likewise, if the TPD is strategically using bicycle stops to reduce the number of bicycle thefts, then bicycle stops should take place where bicycle thefts are most prevalent (or possibly where they are most likely to be recovered). And finally, if the TPD is using bicycle stops as a proactive crime prevention strategy in high crime areas, then bicycle stops should be more frequent in such areas.
To address the second question, we conducted a natural experimental analysis. The publication of the TBT article on bicycle citations in Tampa led to an abrupt and substantial reduction in the number of bicycle stops made by the TPD. Specifically, in comparison to the same period in 2014 (May 1 – August 30), the number of bicycle stops dropped from 2,733 to 1,439—a 47 percent reduction in the number of bicycle stops. The number of bicycle citations during the same period dropped roughly 70 percent.

These reductions in bicycle stops and citations were not the result of any policy change or formal directive to de-emphasize bicycle stops (according to TPD officers and command staff). Instead this reduction appears to be attributable to a chilling effect caused by the article’s publication, which made TPD officers reluctant to make bicycle stops out of concern that doing so might bring unwanted scrutiny.

This situation is suitable for a natural experiment, as the publication of the TBT article was beyond the control of the TPD, and the timing of its publication was unrelated to crime rates. This natural experiment allows us to quantify the effect of bicycle stops—more precisely, the effect of the reduction in the number of stops on bicycle safety, bicycle theft, and total crime. Specifically, we compared the number of bicycle crashes with injury, the number of bicycle thefts, and the number of Part I crimes reported to the TPD before and after the publication of the TBT article. If bicycle stops achieve the goals stated by the TPD, then this reduction in bicycle stops after the publication of the bicycle citation article should cause the number of bicycle crashes, bicycle thefts, and Part I crimes to increase.

**Rationale 1. Bicycle law enforcement enhances bicycle safety**

*Bicycle safety priorities in Tampa*

In a report published on August 14, 2015, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention concluded that Florida has the highest rate of bicycling deaths of any state in the nation, at 0.57 per 100,000 people, which is more than double the nationwide rate of 0.23 per 100,000. As a state, Florida has taken a proactive and aggressive approach to addressing the serious issues and risk factors involved with pedestrian and bicycle fatalities and injuries, with solutions focusing on collaborative efforts encompassing the three E’s: engineering, education, and enforcement.

The TBT article published on April 17, 2015 reports that Florida’s bicycle laws are obscure and difficult to find, suggesting that those being stopped and cited by the TPD have no idea that they are in violation. A commitment to enhancing public awareness of bicycle-riding safety measures,

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including increased knowledge of state bicycle laws among all riders, continues to be a top priority in the state of Florida. This is evidenced by the creation, publication, and subsequent implementation of specific goals, objectives, and campaigns set forth in the Center for Urban Transportation Research’s 2013 Florida Pedestrian and Bicycle Strategic Safety Plan (PBSSP), many of which directly support and guide law enforcement’s role in bicycle law education and high visibility law enforcement.

This need for enhanced cyclist safety measures is also a priority for the city of Tampa. The PBSSP ranks Hillsborough County as number four of the top ten highest priority counties in the state, based on data regarding pedestrian fatalities and injuries (including bicycle fatality crashes and injuries) from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ (DHSMV) traffic crash statistics reports.31 As such, law enforcement and other community stakeholders in Tampa play a critical role, with shared responsibility and obligations to participate in bicycle law education and enforcement however trivial or obscure the laws may seem to the general public or uniformed rider.

The TPD has acted on this priority in a number of ways, including enforcement of bicycle laws through stops, warnings, and citations to those in violation. Through a partnership with the Florida Department of Transportation, the TPD has distributed thousands of bicycle lights to those in need to increase safety and compliance with Florida Statute 316.2065(7), which states:

Every bicycle in use between sunset and sunrise shall be equipped with a lamp on the front exhibiting a white light visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the front and a lamp and reflector on the rear each exhibiting a red light visible from a distance of 600 feet to the rear. A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with lights or reflectors in addition to those required by this section. A law enforcement officer may issue a bicycle safety brochure and a verbal warning to a bicycle rider who violates this subsection or may issue a citation and assess a fine for a pedestrian violation as provided in s. 318.18.

In addition to traditional enforcement activities, the TPD collaborates with numerous pedestrian safety organizations such as Tampa BayCycle and the Center for Urban Transportation and Research and related campaigns such as Bike/Walk Tampa Bay and Alert Today/Tonight Alive Tomorrow, which aim to educate the public on the laws and safe cycling practices through workshops and a variety of outreach efforts.32

31 Florida DHSMV, “Crash and Citation Reports and Statistics.”
Simply stated, according to the TPD, Tampa police officers make a relatively large number of bicycle stops (and citations) in an effort to improve bicycle safety. In the sections below, we evaluate whether the TPD actually used bicycle stops in a manner consistent with trying to improve bicycle safety and whether bicycle stops are actually effective in improving bicycle safety.

*What is the relationship between the location of bicycle stops and bicycle crashes?*

To address this question, we examined the location of where bicycle stops and bicycle crashes are most prevalent. Again, if bicycle safety is the driving factor behind the TPD’s use of bicycle stops, then grids with greater numbers of bicycle crashes should also have greater numbers of bicycle stops. As figure 1 on page 23 shows, there are three grids with a high number of bicycle crashes and bicycle stops. However, most of the grids with a high number of bicycle crashes do not have a high number of bicycle stops. If the TPD were strategically focusing bicycle stop activities on bicycle safety, then we would have expected a greater amount of enforcement activity where bicycle crashes are occurring. To be clear, it is possible that the TPD intended to use bicycle stops as a means of improving bicycle safety but did so in a manner that does not focus on parts of the city most in need—we cannot rule out this possibility. Here we simply find a spatial mismatch between where bicycle stops most frequently occurred and where bicycle crashes most commonly occurred.

*Do bicycle stops reduce the number of bicycle crashes?*

After the publication of the TBT article on bicycle citations in Tampa, there was a sharp reduction in the number of bicycle stops and citations compared to the same period (May–October) of 2014: Bicycle stops and citations dropped by approximately 45 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Further, as the TPD did not require officers to record every bicycle stop prior to May 2015, the actual reduction in the number of bicycle stops may well be greater than these figures indicate. In any case, bicycle stops (and citations) declined sharply after the publication of the TBT article. We can estimate the effect of this large reduction in bicycle law enforcement on bicycle crashes, bicycle recovery, and crime.

Table 6 on page 35 compares the number of bicycle crashes with injuries per month before and after the TBT news story. If bicycle stops are effective in enhancing bicycle safety, then we expect to observe an increase in the number of bicycle crashes after the TPD substantially reduced the number of bicycle stops. The results in table 6, however, contradict this expectation. The number of bicycle crashes per month was roughly 19 percent *lower* after the
reduction in the number of stops than in comparison to the same period in 2014. Thus, we find no evidence to support the contention that the TPD’s bicycle law enforcement as practiced in the period of interest was effective in enhancing bicycle safety as measured by the number of bicycle crashes involving injuries.

Table 6. Average number of bicycle crashes with injuries per month before and after the TBT article

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May–October 2014</th>
<th>May–October 2015 (after TBT article)</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean bicycle crashes with injuries per month (standard deviation)</td>
<td>26.67 (5.79)</td>
<td>21.67 (6.98)</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be emphasized that we assessed the TPD’s bicycle stop strategy only during the period of interest; it is possible that bicycle stops could be useful in improving bicycle safety if this tactic were implemented in a different fashion (e.g., conducting bicycle stops in areas with high rates of bicycle crashes).

Findings regarding TPD bicycle law enforcement and bicycle safety

Finding 8. Bicycle safety statistics indicate that the Tampa area has serious bicycle safety problems as measured by injuries and fatalities. Therefore, efforts to improve bicycle safety are laudable and clearly needed.

Finding 9. One of the rationales stated by the TPD for emphasizing bicycle stops is that bicycle stops help to improve bicycle safety. We find, however, that there is a spatial mismatch between where bicycle crashes involving injuries take place and where the TPD most frequently makes bicycle stops. This mismatch undermines the TPD’s claimed rationale for conducting a large number of bicycle stops or, at a minimum, indicates that the TPD implemented these efforts in a non-strategic manner.

Finding 10. The bicycle safety rationale for making a large number of bicycle stops implicitly assumes that bicycle stops are an effective means of improving bicycle safety. We tested this assumption by comparing the number of bicycle crashes before and after the TPD substantially

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33 We compared the six-month period after the TBT article’s publication to the same six-month period in 2014 to account for seasonal effects.
reduced the number of bicycle stops made. Our analyses find that the TPD’s use of bicycle stops does not appear to improve bicycle safety, as there were fewer crashes after the number of bicycle stops dropped considerably. This result is inconsistent with the notion that bicycle stops as practiced by the TPD in the period of interest are effective in improving bicycle safety.

Rationale 2. Bicycle law enforcement reduces bicycle theft

The TPD has also indicated that bicycle theft is a major contributor to the total crime burden in Tampa. According to available TPD data and FBI UCR statistics, 1,372 bicycles were reported stolen in 2014, making up 13 percent of Part 1 crimes reported to the TPD and 16 percent of all thefts.\textsuperscript{34} Concern for this problem was echoed by nearly all individuals interviewed as part of this process. However, several noted that it is perceived as unfair to have the onus upon the rider of a bicycle to prove it is not stolen when stopped by the TPD. Clearly, the public expects the police to address the problem of stolen bicycles. For the TPD, that expectation translates to theft prevention and enforcement efforts.

The TPD urges citizens to properly lock bicycles, close and secure garage doors, and implement other antitheft strategies and practices, including online bicycle registration with the TPD, a free service available to anyone, which captures information from bicycle owners such as bicycle serial number, color, make, model, description, and owner contact information. Use of the registration service allows for easier identification and return of property to owners whenever stolen bicycles are recovered. According to available data through June 2015, the TPD has registered more than 1,600 bicycles since the commencement of the program.

Clearly bicycle theft is a large problem in Tampa, but connecting that problem to a strategy involving bicycle stops is less clear. To address the role of bicycle stops in the TPD’s strategy to control bicycle thefts, we focus on three issues. First, we assess the extent to which the TPD strategically conducts bicycle stops in areas with greater numbers of bicycle thefts. If the TPD is using bicycle stops in an effort to control bicycle thefts, then the number of bicycle stops conducted in an area should be strongly associated with the number of bicycle thefts in that area. Second, we evaluate the effectiveness of bicycle stops in controlling bicycle theft by using the natural experiment method described on page 32. And finally, we examine how often bicycle stops recover stolen bicycles. If bicycle stops are an effective strategy for addressing bicycle theft, then a fair number of bicycle stops should result in the recovery of a stolen bicycle.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} FBI, \textit{Uniform Crime Reports 2014}, table 8.
\textsuperscript{35} In fact, the TPD recovered 228 stolen bicycles between August 2014 and October 2015 using methods that do not involve bicycle stops, suggesting that alternatives to bicycles stops are available for recovering stolen bicycles.


**Does the location of bicycle stops match the location of bicycle theft?**

We noted that TPD makes bicycle stops at higher rates in high crime areas (grids) than in areas with lower crime rates. We interpreted this finding as being consistent with the use of bicycle stops as a general crime control tactic. However, there is another highly relevant possibility: The TPD conducts more bicycle stops in high crime areas because bicycle theft is most common in these areas.

We aimed to explore this possibility using TPD data. We examined the relationship between the number of bicycles stolen in a grid and the number of bicycle stops conducted in that grid. Figure 4 shows the relationship. For 95 percent of Tampa’s 239 total grids, the number of bicycles reported stolen is less than 40 over the roughly three-year period for which we have data on stolen bicycles.

**Figure 4. Relationship between the number of stolen bicycles and the number of street checks in a grid**

![Graph showing the relationship between the number of stolen bicycles and the number of street checks in a grid.]

Note: Numbers next to points on the figure correspond with TPD grid numbers.
Over that range, we find that, generally, the more bicycles reported stolen, the more bicycle stops conducted by the TPD. The finding can be seen in figure 4 by noting the upward slope in the data points. However, this relationship is weak. There are several grids with 35 to 40 bicycles reported stolen, a relatively high number of thefts, yet the number of bicycle stops conducted in these grids varies wildly, from less than 10 to nearly 400. Moreover, there are three grids that have exceptionally high numbers of reported bicycle thefts, but the TPD conducted relatively few bicycle stops in these grids. These three grids are 133 (Davis Island), 145 (Harbour Island and Channel District), and 160 (a square grid bounded by South Armenia Avenue and South Rome Avenue, between West Kennedy Boulevard and West Swann Avenue). Further still, there were several grids in which the TPD conducted exceptionally high numbers of bicycle stops (e.g., more than 200 stops) though the number of reported bicycle thefts was not exceptionally high; grids 20, 38, 39, 95, and 98 fall in this category. Thus, the volume of street checks is weakly related to the number of bicycles reported stolen.

These findings reinforce the notion that the TPD used bicycle stops in the period of interest as a general crime control tactic—not specifically to combat bicycle theft. If the TPD had used bicycle stops specifically to fight bicycle theft, the number of bicycle stops in a grid would have been more strongly related to the number of bicycle thefts in that grid. At a minimum, the data show that the TPD’s strategy to address bicycle theft was not conducted in a strategic manner (e.g., focusing efforts on areas that were subject to the highest levels of theft).

Do bicycle stops reduce bicycle thefts?

If bicycle stops are effective in reducing bicycle thefts, then the number of bicycle thefts should increase substantially in response to the large reduction in bicycle stops and citations after the publication of the TBT article. Table 7 on page 39 shows the average number of bicycle thefts per month before and after the TBT article. Here we compared the average number of bicycle thefts per month in the six-month period after the publication of the article (May–October 2015) to the same period the previous year (May–October 2014). The results in table 7 reveal that the average numbers of bicycle thefts per month in these two time periods were virtually identical (128.83 after publication vs. 128 in the year before). This change represents less than a 1 percent increase in bicycle thefts after the TPD reduced the number of bicycle stops made.

The relatively large number of bicycle thefts reported to the TPD made it possible to examine the relationship between bicycle stops and bicycle thefts at the district level. The bottom portion of table 7 reports these district-level analyses. In Districts 2 and 3, the number of

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36 We compared the six-month period after the TBT article’s publication to the same six-month period in 2014 to account for seasonal effects.

37 A few bicycle thefts had missing location information. These cases were excluded from the district level analyses.
bicycle thefts increased modestly, by 9 percent and 6 percent respectively; yet in no district was the change in bicycle thefts statistically significant or substantively large. Based on these data, bicycle stops as conducted by the TPD in the period of interest do not appear to be effective in reducing the number of bicycle thefts in Tampa.

Table 7. Average number of bicycle thefts per month before and after the TBT article

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May–October 2014</th>
<th>May–October 2015 (after TBT article)</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average total bicycle thefts (standard deviation)</td>
<td>128.00 (13.31)</td>
<td>128.83 (17.20)</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
<td>43.00 (11.37)</td>
<td>37.33 (11.09)</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>39.83 (11.02)</td>
<td>43.50 (5.96)</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
<td>44.67 (10.78)</td>
<td>47.50 (5.82)</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do efforts result in the recovery of stolen bicycles? Is this a reasonable value given the number of stops?

At our request, the TPD searched records of bicycles TPD officers recovered between August 1, 2014 and October 31, 2015. During this period, there were 19 bicycles recovered as a result of bicycle stops. For context, during this same period, more than 1,700 bicycles were reported stolen to the TPD. This amounts to an average recovery rate of 1.3 bicycles per month or approximately 1% of all bicycles reported stolen over this period. If stolen bicycles are to be used as a motivation for the volume of bicycle stops, the TPD and the Tampa community should have dialogue as to whether the value of the property recovered warrants the level of bicycle stops.

During the same period, the TPD documented about 355 bicycle stops per month, although not until May 2015 did the TPD begin documenting all bicycle stops. Therefore, 355 bicycle stops per month is a lower bound on the average number of bicycle stops per month. About 5 percent of these stops involve investigation of suspicious activity, known suspects, sex offenders, and criminal acts, not simply a stop for bicycle-related infractions or bicycle safety issues. Certainly the value of the stop should not merely be judged by whether stolen property was recovered, but on average the TPD recovers about one bicycle for every 280 bicycle stops. This return is likely below the value that would warrant a bicycle stop initiative aimed at recovering stolen bicycles.
Findings regarding TPD bicycle law enforcement and bicycle thefts

Finding 11. Theft statistics and public comments on Tampa crime signal that bicycle theft is indeed a crime problem meriting the TPD’s attention. Bicycle theft is 17 percent of all reported theft and 11 percent of all serious crime in Tampa.

Finding 12. There is a mismatch between the places with large numbers of stolen bicycles and those with the most bicycle stops. Neighborhoods with higher numbers of reported stolen bicycles have only a slightly higher number of bicycle stops.

Finding 13. The rate of bicycle stops is weakly related to the number of reported stolen bicycles in an area. While bicycle stops increased in frequency as the number of reported bicycles stolen increased, this relationship was weak. Several areas had relatively high levels of bicycle theft but relatively low levels of bicycle stops. On the other hand, several areas had relatively high volumes of bicycle stops but relatively low levels of bicycle theft.

Finding 14. The recovery of a stolen bicycle is a rare outcome of a bicycle stop. Over a 15-month period, the TPD recovered 19 bicycles as a result of bicycle stops out of more than 1,700 bicycles reported stolen during this period. The recovery of stolen bicycles does not provide sufficient justification for this level of enhanced enforcement of bicycle laws.

Finding 15. The TPD recovered 19 stolen bicycles from bicycle stops over a 15-month period. During the same period, the TPD conducted more than 5,300 bicycle stops, averaging roughly one bicycle for every 280 bicycle stops.

Finding 16. There is no need for the TPD and the victims of bicycle theft in Tampa to ignore the issue of stolen bicycles, but other initiatives besides bicycle stops may be more effective. The TPD has been actively encouraging bicyclists to register their bicycles. During the study period, in 17 percent of bicycle street checks stops and 23 percent of bicyclists stopped (several bicyclists have been stopped on multiple occasions), the police have aided bicyclists in registering their bicycles. We did not find studies indicating that bicycle registration reduces bicycle theft, but there is some evidence that registration can improve chances that stolen bicycles will be returned to their owners.38

Finding 17. While there is an obligation for law enforcement to address bicycle theft, there is also a need for deeper awareness messaging to the community on personal theft prevention measures, as well as direct notification that law enforcement may be stepping up enforcement in areas of the city where bicycle thefts are occurring and where stolen bicycles are recovered.

38 Johnson, Sidebottom, and Thorpe, Problem-Oriented Guides: Bicycle Theft.
Rationale 3. Bicycle law enforcement is part of a proactive crime prevention strategy in high crime areas

Finally, the TBT asserts that the TPD’s use of bicycle stops is an extension of its proactive policing approach to crime fighting. During interviews with TPD officers at all levels of seniority, we heard that proactive policing is an important component of TPD culture and strategy. Indeed, according to a 2013 departmental report, 68 percent of the department’s 703,577 police actions for that year were not in response to dispatched calls but were designated as proactive police calls, police activity not initiated by a call for service.³⁹

Proactive policing is a philosophical approach that guides rather than defines police procedures and patrol activities. It seeks to disrupt criminal activity before it occurs, unlike a reactive approach that merely responds to crimes that have already occurred. As such, it relies heavily on data regarding crime patterns, locations, victims, and offenders to support and inform decision making.

Used extensively since the early 1990s by law enforcement agencies throughout the country, the proactive policing approach was implemented in Tampa in 2002 in the form of a complete organizational overhaul and comprehensive implementation of the Focus on Four Crime Reduction Plan. At that time, Tampa had one of the highest crime rates in the United States for a city its size. For more than 10 consecutive years since, Tampa has experienced a reduction in crime every year, reporting a 65.8 percent overall reduction in crime in the city as of the end of 2012.

The TPD attributes these accomplishments to the implementation of the Focus on Four plan, which included simplifying its mission statement to better communicate the crime reduction commitment, while drawing focus to the importance of quality of life; community involvement; and proactive, police-initiated activity and accountability. The plan is built upon and leverages four key guiding components (redistribution of tactical resources, intelligence-led policing, proactive and preventative policing initiatives, and community partnerships) that address the “big four” high-volume crime patterns of burglary, robbery, auto burglary, and auto theft.⁴⁰

The decentralization of patrol operations and community outreach efforts among the city’s three police districts is a key part of the Focus on Four plan’s implementation. Within each district, TPD patrol, investigative, and neighborhood liaison personnel are assigned to specific geographic areas, or zones, in which they are tasked with building and maintaining “zonership,” or thorough knowledge of crime patterns, quality of life issues, problem locations, repeat offenders, victims, and community stakeholders in the neighborhoods within their zones. The

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³⁹ Tampa Police Department, 2013 Tampa Statistics.
⁴⁰ Tampa Police Department, Focus on Four.
zones generally correspond with (but may be smaller than) the 239 grids into which the city is divided. TPD patrol operations are driven by both calls for service and proactive efforts within the city’s grids.

The ultimate goal of the TPD’s grid strategy would be to have zero red, orange, or yellow grids—for all of Tampa’s neighborhoods, residents, and business communities to be free from serious crime. To that end, the TPD reports strategically deploying resources, personnel, and outreach efforts to the grids, focusing on the specific crime and quality of life issues present in the grids. These efforts vary from district to grid to zone. In 2002, at the outset of the TPD’s organizational transformation, the city of Tampa had 133 red grids (geographic areas with 120 or more Part 1 Offenses per year), 37 orange grids (areas with 84 to 119 Part 1 Offenses per year), 26 yellow grids (areas with 48 to 83 Part 1 Offenses per year), and 44 unmarked grids (areas with zero to 47 Part 1 Offenses per year). By the end of 2014, the numbers had nearly reversed, with just seven red, 21 orange, 56 yellow, and 155 unmarked grids. The magnitude of this crime reduction, and the focused, collaborative work required of the TPD and the community to achieve it, cannot be understated.

The TPD has articulated that bicycle stops comprise just one part of this overall proactive policing strategy to prevent and reduce crime in Tampa’s high crime neighborhoods. In 2014, the TPD issued more than 100,000 citations, 553 of which were bicycle citations. Interviews with TPD personnel indicate that one of the primary rationales for bicycle stops and citations is in response to trends, particularly in Tampa’s red grid areas, of individuals using and riding bicycles in the commission of a wide variety of street crimes. The TPD employs bicycle stops in these areas proactively, in an effort to interrupt both violent crime and street-level drug trade.

Specifically, it was pointed out on several occasions that criminals have learned to avoid being identified, surveilled, stopped, or apprehended by “going low-tech”—i.e., by avoiding such identifying characteristics as license tags thus denying the TPD a speedy avenue for computer searches and identification. One possible explanation offered by the TPD for this phenomenon is that the TPD has so effectively addressed the problem of auto theft, a crime that is down by 90.9 percent since 2002,\(^41\) that individuals have turned to stealing and riding bicycles to carry out criminal activity more anonymously and surreptitiously.

The TPD reported that Districts 3 and 2 are areas in which bicycles are instrumental in the commission of crimes other than bicycle theft, including burglaries, drugs, and, in some cases, even drive-by shootings. It was noted during team interviews that a juvenile offender recently had been stopped on a bicycle and arrested in possession of two firearms. Community members and neighborhood leaders in District 3 echoed this information, as their observations indicate that criminals on bicycles “have their way” in the neighborhoods of District 3.

\(^{41}\) Tampa Police Department, 2012 Annual Report.
A proactive policing strategy best explains the patterns of bicycle stop data that we observe. For example, the neighborhoods with the largest number of calls for service related to bicycles (suggesting that the public is concerned with suspect activities involving individuals with bicycles) are also the places with the greatest volume of bicycle stops.

Proactive policing can be a legitimate strategy for addressing crime problems in a community; however, it requires a substantial amount of communication with the general public, key stakeholders, and individuals impacted by proactive policing action. In order to effectively implement a proactive policing strategy, the TPD needs to balance between identifying and intervening with those likely to commit crimes and excessively detaining and marginalizing the vast majority of Tampa residents who are not involved in crime.

Are bicycle stops more prevalent in high crime areas (red and orange grids)?

The analyses reported in the section “Are the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops explained by place-based differences in bicycling enforcement?” on page 24 are repeated here, as they are relevant in addressing this question. To answer this question, we calculated rates of bicycle stops by grid color. For example, there were 2,223 bicycle stops made in the 128 unmarked (low crime) grids, for a rate of 17.4 bicycle stops per grid. Figure 5 reports these rates by grid color. This figure clearly shows that the likelihood of a bicycle stop is considerably larger in high crime grids (orange and red grids) than in low crime grids (unmarked and yellow grids). Thus, there is a relatively strong relationship between grid color and the rate of bicycle stops. These findings clearly indicate that bicycle stops are more prevalent in high crime areas.

Figure 5. Bicycle stops per grid by grid color
When compared with stolen bicycles and bicycle safety, how do calls for service relate to the number of bicycle stops?

Figure 5 on page 43 strongly suggests that the use of bicycle stops is strongly focused on higher crime neighborhoods. We jointly analyzed the number of street checks and their relationship to the grid’s red, orange, and yellow color grade; number of bicycle-related calls for service (e.g., reports of suspicious person with a bicycle); number of stolen bicycles; and number of bicycle crashes. Table 8 shows the results.\(^{42}\) For calls for service, stolen bicycles, and bicycle crashes, the relative increase column describes the expected increase in the number of street checks for a doubling of the given feature. For example, for two grids where one grid had twice as many bicycle-related calls for service, that same grid would have about 1.75 times as many street checks. This suggests that TPD street check efforts are roughly proportional to the number of calls for service. By comparison, grids with more stolen bicycles or more bicycle crashes have only slightly more street checks.

### Table 8. Joint relationship between grid features and number of street checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grid feature</th>
<th>Relative increase *</th>
<th>95% confidence interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle calls for service</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>(1.55–1.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stolen bicycles</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>(0.94–1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle crashes</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>(0.91–1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow grid color</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>(0.96–1.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange grid color</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>(0.99–1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red grid color</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>(0.73–1.69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For calls for service, stolen bicycles, and bicycle crashes, the relative increase column reflects the relative increase in the expected number of street checks for a doubling of the given feature (bicycle calls for service, stolen bicycles, and bicycle crashes). For grid colors, the relative increase column reflects the increase relative to those low crime grids.

\(^{42}\) These estimates were derived from a Poisson regression model predicting the number of street checks from \(\log_2\) (number of calls for service), \(\log_2\) (number of bicycles stolen), and separate terms for whether the grid was labeled yellow, orange, or red. Robust standard errors were used to address overdispersion. Although 30 percent of the calls for service involve reports of stolen bicycles, rerunning the model excluding stolen bicycles from calls for service produces roughly the same estimates.
After accounting for the number of calls for service, of which 30 percent involve stolen bicycles, bicycle theft alone appears not to be strongly related to the number of street checks. A doubling of the number of stolen bicycles is associated with a 9 percent increase in the number of street checks, though the precision of this estimate is small enough so that we cannot be sure that there is any relationship. A doubling of the number of bicycle crashes in a neighborhood was associated with a 2 percent increase in the number of street checks, but zero is within the margin of error of this estimate. Last, we find that yellow, orange, or red grids have, on average, about 26 percent more street checks than those neighborhoods not color-coded.

While the volume of street checks in a neighborhood does not seem strongly driven by the number of stolen bicycles, it does appear that the number of street checks is strongly related to reports of crime. So all evidence points to crime being the primary driver of bicycle stops, not bicycle safety or recovery of stolen bicycles.

*Do bicycle stops reduce crime?*

The TPD’s use of bicycle stops as part of its proactive policing strategy implicitly assumes that bicycle stops are effective in controlling crime. This implicit belief was explicitly confirmed by the TPD in interviews conducted by the VCPI’s technical assistance team. But the TPD’s belief in the premise does not answer the underlying question: Are bicycle stops effective in controlling crime?

Assessing the relationship between bicycle stops and crime is very important, because if bicycle stops are effective in reducing crime, then one can argue that the disproportionate burden placed on Black bicyclists is offset by the benefit of reduced crime in Black neighborhoods. On the other hand, if bicycle stops are not effective in reducing crime, then the burden placed on Black bicyclists is difficult to justify.

To estimate the effect of bicycle stops on crime in Tampa, again we used the natural experimental approach. This approach contrasts the level of Part 1 crime before and after the publication of the TBT article. However, unlike the previous analyses, Part 1 crime shows strong time trends and strong seasonal effects. Specifically, crime in Tampa for more than a decade has been on a decidedly downward trajectory. Likewise, crime in Tampa shows seasonal effects, with Part 1 crime being notably lower in February and March on average. To account for these crime patterns, we employ a more sophisticated analysis than those discussed previously. In particular, we use a “difference-in-difference” approach, which assesses whether the change in Part 1 crime after the article is notably higher than what we would have expected from seasonal changes and overall decrease in crime from 2014 to 2015.
We estimated this as \( \frac{a}{b} \div \frac{c}{d} \), where the variables represent the following:

- \( a = \) Crimes between May and October 2015 (after the TBT article)
- \( b = \) Crimes between May and October 2014
- \( c = \) Crimes between January and April 2015
- \( d = \) Crimes between January and April 2014

The fraction in the denominator captures the trend in crime from 2014 to 2015, while the numerator compares the period after the TBT article with the same period the year before. We also adjusted our estimate to account for differences in crime by district. We estimate that the change in crime after the TBT article and the reduction of bicycle stops was between -8.4 percent and 17.8 percent, meaning that the data cannot distinguish between crime going up, down, or staying flat as a result of the reduction in bicycle stops.

We find that crime did not substantially change after the TBT article. Our point estimate of the change is approximately a 4 percent increase in Part 1 crime after the publication of the TBT article; yet this estimate has a relatively large standard error, making this estimated effect imprecise. We do not have sufficient precision to give good estimates broken down by district or crime type. We find little evidence that the drop in bicycle stops resulted in a crime increase, suggesting that citations might not be effective in reducing crime. In fact, the evidence most strongly indicates that the reduction in bicycle enforcement had no discernible effect on crime in Tampa.

**Findings regarding the TPD’s proactive crime prevention through enforcement of bicycle laws**

**Finding 18.** The rate at which the TPD conducts bicycle stops is considerably higher in areas with relatively high crime rates (i.e., orange and red grids). The rates of bicycle stops in orange and red grids are more than five times greater than the rates of bicycle stops in unmarked grids (low crime areas) and twice as high as bicycle stops rate in yellow grids. This indicates that the TPD does in fact concentrate its use of bicycle stops in areas with crime problems.

**Finding 19.** The effect of bicycle stops on Part 1 crimes appears to be small, but our estimate is imprecise. Using the sharp reduction in bicycle stops after the TBT article was published as a natural experiment on the effect of bicycle stops on crime in Tampa, we find that the effect of this sharp reduction in bicycle stops is somewhere between an 8 percent drop in crime and an 18 percent increase in crime. Given this imprecise effect, the most conservative interpretation of this analysis is that the reduction in bicycle stops had no discernible effect on crime.
4. Community Perceptions

This chapter includes a brief summary of relevant themes and concerns expressed by members of the community regarding the TPD (generally) and the efficacy—or lack thereof—of the bicycle law enforcement practices. These remarks and themes were derived from the community listening session, which took place in Tampa on July 14, 2015; from the community feedback portal; and from one-on-one interviews with Tampa elected officials and key community stakeholders. The summary of community perceptions is organized into three themes: positive, negative, and neutral. There are several important factors to consider regarding this chapter. Because of the diverse cross-section of community stakeholders interviewed, an equally diverse and passionate spectrum of opinions, perspectives, and perceptions emerged. The team has taken great care to summarize these concerns with accuracy, while respecting the anonymity of those interviewed. Furthermore, because we have sought to summarize the concerns, perspectives, and opinions expressed by the community, we do not present them as fact, nor do we certify or suggest that they are necessarily based on accurate facts.

Finally, it is worth noting that a number of the community observations do not relate directly to the bicycle law enforcement issue but to larger police conduct and relationships. One possible reason for this may be what a multitude of community members and elected officials, including the Tampa mayor and city councilpersons, indicated during interviews: that they had not been aware of the allegations of racial profiling in TPD bicycle stops and citations until reading the TBT article.

Positive community perceptions

There are two categories of positive community comments and perceptions regarding the bicycle law enforcement practice and (in some cases) the TPD as a whole.

The first deals with the public’s view of the legitimacy and necessity of bicycle stops and the perceived need for such practices, as well as the perception of a crime problem requiring TPD attention. Community members expressed concerns about the high volume of stolen bicycles in Tampa and the problems associated with people using stolen bicycles to commit crimes. Community members commented that they feel young people on bicycles are the source of a great deal of neighborhood trouble, with several alleging that they see bicyclists selling drugs and calling for police intervention.

Specifically, some citizens expressed the sentiment that the police, in making bicycle stops and issuing warnings and citations, are responding to the need for continued and constant focus on reducing crime in high crime, violent neighborhoods. Similarly, citizens echoed the sentiment among police that a criminal element uses bicycles to move drugs in these neighborhoods,
legitimizing police action. This was augmented by the opinion that TPD officers “know their zones” (the people and the crime patterns), which makes them effective at targeting appropriate areas and conduct.

Along the same lines, community members living and doing business in areas with high violent crime and drug trafficking in District 3 shared with the team that they welcome and want police attention there. Consistent with this theme, community members said they had observed that police bicycle stops in these areas has resulted in positive changes in terms of addressing guns and drugs.

The second category involves generally positive comments about the TPD, including the broad notion that TPD officers are diligent, helpful, personable, and effective in focusing on the protection of citizens. For instance, many vocal District 2 community members shared specific stories of care and concern by TPD officers for citizens—as evidenced by the police practice of checking the homes of individuals away on vacation. This was echoed by an owner of a subsidized housing development who believes that TPD bicycle citations were and are highly effective in reducing crime. Police response times were lauded, as was the practice of police being vigilant to remove trespassers from properties while simultaneously being professional and courteous.

Consistent across all districts was the expressed notion that citizens themselves recognize the challenges and dangers police face and are concerned for their welfare.

**Negative community perceptions**

The majority of negative community observations and statements shared with the team involve perceptions of TPD conduct and relationships in general (and sometimes non–TPD–specific police conduct in general), as opposed to being specifically related to bicycle law enforcement. However, multiple community members did comment specifically on a few bicycle-related issues, one being that the laws pertaining to bicycles are unknown by the general public and are difficult to find, and another being that it is seen as unfair to have onus upon the rider of a bicycle to prove it is not stolen.

Community members expressed concern that at times the police can be disrespectful, heavy-handed, and even dehumanizing in their interactions with the public, treatment that can provoke adversarial encounters and escalate situations, and that the police need to communicate more effectively with citizens. There is a feeling that there may be unwritten rules and policies of the TPD that support discrimination, including department culture and its focus on statistics. It was suggested that racial tensions in general have been “bubbling” under the surface for some time and that there is a widespread, general resentment of the TPD in the older Black community, which is affecting the younger generation as well.
Some community members feel that the TPD “over polices” and harasses young people, treating young men in the Black community harshly—often (wrongfully) like criminals. Some believe that the disparity in bicycle stops is an example of this. Others suggested that the TPD needs more sensitivity training and diversity training department-wide and that it should more deeply incorporate community members as advisors into police programs, policy reviews, updates, the creation of problem-solving strategies, and recruitment and hiring efforts. Several community members expressed the sentiment that the “police cannot enforce laws without relationships.”

Some believe that the fear of retaliation by police prevents citizens from coming forward and complaining about police misconduct. Others noted that the fear of retaliation, not from police but from criminals, is having a negative effect in the worst neighborhoods. Finally, some went beyond alleging racial animus and motivation, asserting that there is no difference in treatment between White and Black TPD officers and that sometimes Black officers treat citizens worse.

Neutral community perceptions

While virtually all community members’ comments were helpful, some were particularly constructive and may be useful in fashioning bridges between the TPD and the community.

Nearly all segments of the community observed a need for more traditional community policing and more police-community engagement by the TPD and the community. Nearly all who offered comment expect the police to balance fairness and effectiveness, while treating people with dignity and respect in their law enforcement duties, for the good of the community. Many acknowledged the existence of both good and bad officers and citizens in the community, with the TPD undeservedly getting a bad reputation while, in this case, trying to accomplish good.

Numerous community members across all districts believe in the utility of the TPD Citizens’ Academy as a way to connect, build mutual trust, and understand perspectives and complexities of police work. Suggested areas for general improvement offered by community members include, among others, crisis intervention, de-escalation, and dealing with people with mental illness and with special needs—including individuals for whom bicycles are the only transportation options. Other specific suggestions include incorporating department-wide use of body cameras and improved officer supervision and accountability.

Findings regarding community perceptions

Finding 20. The community has mixed views on TPD bicycle stops, particularly why the TPD stops bicyclists and why the TPD picks some bicyclists but not others.
Conclusions

Much of the community concern regarding the TPD’s use of bicycle stops has focused on the bicyclists, mostly Black bicyclists, burdened by these stops, which is understandable—no one wants to be treated unfairly, particularly not because of their skin color. At the same time, it is important to note that it appears that the TPD used bicycle stops in an effort to help high crime, often Black communities gain greater public safety. The TPD responded immediately to the community’s concerns by implementing new data reporting protocols for all traffic stops, reducing the volume of bicycle stops and citations, and voluntarily inviting the COPS Office technical assistance team to analyze the practice. This demonstrates the city’s commitment to providing responsive, transparent service to the Tampa community.

Our interviews with TPD officers reveal that these bicycle stops were intended to promote community safety, particularly in areas with the highest crime rates. Further, our interviews with minority residents in high crime communities indicate that many of those interviewed supported the TPD’s efforts to address crime in their community, including their use of bicycle stops. The TPD stated that they intended for bicycle stops to improve community safety—the use of bicycle stops was not intended to harass or intimidate Black bicyclists.

The TPD’s use of bicycle stops lays bare a fundamental issue in criminal justice—balancing the interests of crime control against the interests of individuals. We have no doubt the TPD’s use of bicycle stops is an earnest effort to reduce crime in high crime, most often Black communities, yet these efforts have disproportionately burdened Black bicyclists. Notably, many of the officers who work in District 3, the district with the highest rates of bicycle stops, told us that they chose to work there because they grew up in District 3 or in neighborhoods similar to those in District 3 and want to make it a safer place.

In this context, bicycle stops did not appear to have been made in an effort to discriminate against Black bicyclists; instead, the TPD’s emphasis on bicycling enforcement, by all indications, appears to have been an honest effort to improve community safety in the areas most in need. Simply put, the TPD used bicycle stops to reduce crime in high crime, often largely Black communities by targeting individuals perceived to be suspicious. The TPD burdened Black bicyclists by disproportionately stopping them, with the intention of benefiting Black communities by increasing their public safety.

So, what can be done in Tampa, and other communities facing similar issues, to balance these crime control gains with the burdens placed on the community most affected by them? How can the TPD, and other law enforcement agencies, continue efforts to reduce crime while minimizing harm to the legitimacy and efficacy of their efforts and maintaining public trust?
For the conclusion of this report, we offer a series of recommendations and strategies that may, if implemented, help the TPD to answer these critical questions. First we present broad recommendations regarding proactive policing and procedural justice; then we present specific findings and recommendations related to the TPD’s bicycle law enforcement practices.

**Broad recommendations**

Overall, we recognize that a proactive police force can be preferable to a reactive one. However, proactive policing requires a substantial amount of communication with the general public, key stakeholders, and individuals impacted by proactive policing actions. In addition, proactive policing efforts should rely heavily on the use of data to support and inform their strategy. Based on the data that was provided, the TPD cannot claim that bicycle safety and stolen bicycles drive their bicycle stop strategy, even though certainly many stops might be initiated because of bicycle safety violations, and the TPD does recover some stolen bicycles. The TPD can claim that bicycle stops are part of a proactive policing strategy, but the burden remains to explain to the public that the police are justified in the stops they are conducting, that the stops they are conducting are in fact preventing crime, and that they are conducted in a racially unbiased manner. The burden also remains to explain why stops that do not have a crime-prevention effect were consistent with the strategy (e.g., individuals stopped matched suspect description).

In order to effectively implement a proactive policing strategy, the TPD needs to balance between identifying and intervening with those likely to commit crimes and excessively detaining and marginalizing the vast majority of Tampa residents who are not involved in crime. The police should not hesitate to intervene in response to calls for service or with known offenders when they have probable cause. Significant rifts in public trust can occur when the police regularly stop bicyclists for minor infractions or with minimal suspicion and detain and ticket large numbers of individuals for minor offenses with little explanation.

A police strategy that adheres to the principles of procedural justice is fair, and is transparently fair, to those that the strategy affects. Research suggests that the public is more likely to comply with the law and cooperate in its implementation if they believe that the system is fair, even if it results in some form of sanction against them, such as a stop, citation, or even arrest.43

stops of bicyclists that do not result in a formal sanction can leave the bicyclist believing the police conducted the stop for no good reason, even though the police officer may believe that they gave the bicyclist a break by not issuing a citation. If on the other hand the police explain, for example, that there was a recent assault and the person fit the specific suspect description or that 10 children had been hit by cars in the last year at that intersection when riding at night,

43 Tom R. Tyler, “Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law.”
then procedural justice suggests that the bicyclist will understand what about their behavior prompted the stop and the primary motivation of the officer who chose to conduct the stop. Without this, the bicyclist is left in an information vacuum and can fill that vacuum with the belief of unfairness and bias.

Critical to a procedural justice approach is a race-neutral, evidence-based policing strategy, such as stopping all bicyclists without lights at night because evidence shows that bicycle lights reduce injuries. In interviews, we heard that police can sometimes be disrespectful and heavy-handed in their interactions and encounters with community members, leaving bicyclists feeling dehumanized. They suggested that some police officers provoke adversarial encounters and escalate situations unnecessarily. The TPD reported participating with community members in *Fair and Impartial Policing* training in 2014, a program that explores the science of implicit bias and its impact on policing. Clearly the TPD should continue to do everything it can to encourage fair and impartial policing and minimize adversarial encounters through hiring, training, and investigations.

Referring once again to the results and findings of the data analyses and the TPD and community observations, we offer the following as component parts of a larger potential solution to the controversy going forward:

**Recommendation 1.** There is a need for continued and constant department-wide focus on treating all individuals with dignity and respect, including ongoing training and accountability measures such as assigning designated supervisors to audit citations and arrests to assess perceptions of fair treatment.

**Recommendation 2.** Because the TPD is committed to incorporating data analysis and intelligence into decision making at every stage, down to the line officer, the TPD should enhance its current efforts to convey this process to the community in user-friendly ways such as regular messaging in the already-existing community e-mails and social media.

**Recommendation 3.** The TPD should clearly, regularly, and unambiguously explain that the community can expect to see more officers working with the community to prevent and solve crimes in red grid zones on a daily basis so that the citizens feel informed and part of the solution.

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Recommendation 4. The TPD should embody both transparency and inclusion in its operations, including community members where possible as advisors and contributors to policy reviews, updates, department training opportunities, creation of problem-solving strategies, recruitment and hiring efforts, and data collection strategies. This would be outside of and separate from the proposed citizens review board and would benefit both the agency and the community in countless ways.

Recommendation 5. The TPD should further engage the public by creating and continuing ongoing and regular listening opportunities with the community, not just in response to a problem.

Recommendation 6. The TPD should provide both academy and continuing/in-service training, including training on sensitivity and community policing, to all officers tasked with participation or execution in all matters involving the implementation of crime prevention or crime-fighting initiatives, processes, strategies, or practices, as well as to all law enforcement officials in the chain of command up through and including the department chief.

Recommendation 7. The TPD and the City of Tampa should use an advisory committee composed of citizens from across the geographic, demographic, economic, racial, and gender spectrum in the city. The purpose of this committee would be to provide feedback, questions, suggestions, and overall enhanced communication with the TPD on such topics as existing and proposed crime-related initiatives, strategies, and appropriate policies and practices. Use of an advisory committee could increase both transparency and citizen understanding regarding the motivations and rationales for implementation of law enforcement practices while giving citizens a voice in their design, thus in some cases forestalling unnecessarily controversial or potentially incendiary practices and facilitating a sense of inclusion among the city’s citizens.

Recommendation 8. With the assistance of the aforementioned citizen advisory committee, the TPD could promulgate a plan containing specific components of intended or pending strategy initiatives or practices (excepting those implemented in ongoing criminal investigations or other sensitive matters), then demonstrate and measure that implementation matches the plan, with the goal being to avoid inconsistency in execution as well as ambiguity in methodology, goals, intentions, strategies, and processes.

Recommendation 9. The TPD should continue to collect and analyze data to evaluate and monitor the implementation of its policing strategies. These data can be used by the TPD leadership to make sure that initiatives are implemented as intended (such as bicycle safety initiatives actually being focused in places with the highest rates of bicycle injuries). TPD leadership can also use these data to determine whether a program disproportionately affects certain communities. If the TPD finds a program has a disparate impact, then the TPD can either modify or discontinue the strategy or work with the affected communities in a manner consistent with procedural justice. The TPD should engage with local crime and justice researchers to assist with data collection and analysis.
Findings and recommendations specific to racial disparity in bicycle stops and citations

Finding 1. There are large racial disparities in bicycle stops. In the period of observation (January 2014 to August 2015), 73.2 percent of stopped bicyclists were Black, while 25.9 percent were White. The magnitude of this racial disparity is relatively stable throughout this time period but varies considerably by TPD district.

Finding 2. The observed racial disparities are not attributable to differences in bicycle ridership or manner of bicycle riding, as assessed using the bicycle crash benchmark. In comparison to the proportion of those involved in a bicycle crash with injuries—a proxy for the race distribution of bicyclists in Tampa as well as a proxy of dangerousness of riding—Black bicyclists were disproportionately stopped by the TPD.

Finding 3. The rate of bicycle stops is considerably higher in areas (grids) with relatively high levels of crime than in areas with lower levels of crime. In particular, the rates of bicycle stops were substantially higher in orange and red grids than yellow and unmarked grids.

Finding 4. Among stopped bicyclists, Black bicyclists (5.3 percent) were more likely to receive a formal citation than White bicyclists (3.2 percent). This disparity persisted even after those stopped were statistically matched on place and time. However, after May 1, 2015 when the TPD mandated all bicycle stops be documented as street checks, this disparity disappears.

Recommendation 4.1. The TPD should change the way it uses bicycle stops. The manner in which the TPD used bicycle stops in the period under examination disproportionately affected Black people and residents of higher crime areas, while producing limited benefits and creating the perception that the TPD uses bicycle stops in a racially biased manner. Thus, the simplest recommendation to address these issues is to de-emphasize or substantively change the use of bicycle stops in Tampa.

Finding 5. The data available from the TPD have several limitations, including limited dates of availability and lack of documentation on all street checks and bicycle stops prior to May 1, 2015. These limitations hampered the research team’s ability to prove or disprove the allegation of racial profiling. As a result, it is possible that the observed racial disparities in bicycle stops and citations are attributable to factors not included in the data provided to the research team.

Recommendation 5.1. The TPD should improve its data collection to include ethnicity. Currently, the TPD does not distinguish the ethnicity of suspects or arrestees. This is generally a major omission but particularly for a city like Tampa, which has a large and long-standing Hispanic population.
**Recommendation 5.2.** The TPD should more carefully detail why a bicycle stop was made. The current records use vague, very broad codes for the reason of the street check and bicycle stop: e.g., “bicycle stop-warning,” “bicycle registration,” and “bicycle stop-citation.” The generality of these codes make it impossible to accurately discern why a particular individual was stopped.

**Recommendation 5.3.** The TPD should document the outcomes of bicycle stops, including whether the officer conducted a search; found contraband; issued a warning, citation, or summons; or made an arrest.

**Finding 6.** During the study period, the TPD did not have a policy of documenting all bicycle and traffic stops. The TPD has begun phasing in the documentation of all vehicle traffic stops.

**Recommendation 6.1.** The TPD should pursue an analysis of racial bias in vehicle stops once they have achieved *comprehensive* documentation of stops and a sufficient number of stops have accumulated. This analysis should include an analysis of each officer’s stops to identify officers that disproportionately stop minority drivers.

**Finding 7.** The data suggest that the TPD uses bicycle stops in an effort to reduce crime generally in high crime areas. This is consistent with a pattern of using bicycling violations as a method to deter and investigate potential criminal activity. Bicycle enforcement in these areas disproportionately impact Black residents.

**Recommendation 7.1.** The TPD should monitor the racial disparities in bicycle stops at the department and district levels as well as individual (officer) level. In other words, data on bicycle stops should be monitored and periodically broken down to calculate the overall magnitude of racial disparities for the city, district, and individual officers, in order to identify officers who stop minority bicyclists disproportionately compared to other officers.

**Findings regarding TPD bicycle law enforcement and bicycle safety**

**Finding 8.** Bicycle safety statistics indicate that the Tampa area has serious bicycle safety problems, as measured by injuries and fatalities. Therefore, efforts to improve bicycle safety are laudable and clearly needed.

**Recommendation 8.1.** The TPD should remind officers of and monitor the implementation of the TPD’s policy to issue warnings except for flagrant violations. This may require clarification of the phrase “flagrant violations” so that the officers’ implementation matches management’s intentions.

**Recommendation 8.2.** The TPD should continue to use existing and develop new partnerships with the Tampa bicycling community to enhance opportunities for bicycle law education and awareness.
**Finding 9.** One of the rationales stated by the TPD for emphasizing bicycle stops is that bicycle stops help to improve bicycle safety. We find, however, that there is a spatial mismatch between where bicycle crashes involving injuries take place and where the TPD most frequently makes bicycle stops. This mismatch undermines the TPD’s claimed rationale for conducting a large number of bicycle stops or, at a minimum, indicates that the TPD implemented these efforts in a non-strategic manner.

**Recommendation 9.1.** Enforcement-related efforts to enhance bicycle safety should be conducted in those areas of the city where the most crashes occur. The TPD should ensure that bicycle citations are focused on those committing flagrant bicycle violations or those continuing to violate bicycle laws after repeated warnings.

**Finding 10.** The bicycle safety rationale for making a large number of bicycle stops implicitly assumes that bicycle stops are an effective means of improving bicycle safety. We tested this assumption by comparing the number of bicycle crashes before and after the TPD substantially reduced the number of bicycle stops made. Our analyses find that the TPD’s use of bicycle stops does not appear to improve bicycle safety, as there were fewer crashes after the number of bicycle stops dropped considerably. This result is inconsistent with the notion that bicycle stops as practiced by the TPD in the period of interest are effective in improving bicycle safety.

**Findings and recommendations regarding TPD bicycle law enforcement and bicycle thefts**

**Finding 11.** Theft statistics and public comments on Tampa crime signal that bicycle theft is indeed a crime problem meriting the TPD’s attention. Bicycle theft is 17 percent of all reported theft and 11 percent of all serious crime in Tampa.

**Finding 12.** There is a mismatch between the places with large numbers of stolen bicycles and those with the most bicycle stops. Neighborhoods with higher numbers of reported stolen bicycles have only a slightly higher number of bicycle stops.

**Finding 13.** The rate of bicycle stops is weakly related to the number of reported stolen bicycles in an area. While bicycle stops increased in frequency as the number of reported bicycles stolen increased, this relationship was weak. Several areas had relatively high levels of bicycle theft but relatively low levels of bicycle stops. On the other hand, several areas had relatively high volumes of bicycle stops but relatively low levels of bicycle theft.

**Finding 14.** The recovery of a stolen bicycle is a rare outcome of a bicycle stop. Over a 15-month period, the TPD recovered 19 bicycles as a result of bicycle stops out of more than 1,700 bicycle reported stolen during this period. The recovery of stolen bicycles does not provide sufficient justification for this level of enhanced enforcement of bicycle laws.
Finding 15. The TPD recovered 19 stolen bicycles from bicycle stops over a 15-month period. During the same period, the TPD conducted more than 5,300 bicycle stops, averaging roughly one recovered bicycle for every 280 bicycle stops.

Finding 16. There is no need for the TPD and the victims of bicycle theft in Tampa to ignore the issue of stolen bicycles, but other initiatives besides bicycle stops may be more effective. The TPD has been actively encouraging bicyclists to register their bicycles. During the study period, in 17 percent of bicycle street checks stops and 23 percent of bicyclists stopped (several bicyclists have been stopped on multiple occasions), the police have aided a bicyclist in registering their bicycles. We did not find studies indicating that bicycle registration reduces bicycle theft, but there is some evidence that registration can improve chances that stolen bicycles will be returned to their owners.45

Finding 17. While there is an obligation for law enforcement to address bicycle theft, there is also a need for deeper awareness messaging to the community on personal theft prevention measures, as well as direct notification that law enforcement may be stepping up enforcement in areas of the city where bicycle thefts are occurring and where stolen bicycles are recovered.

Recommendation 17.1. The TPD should respond to the problem of bicycle theft using strategies that do not involve a large number of bicycle stops. These include the continuation of the TPD’s efforts to encourage the registration of bicycles, placement of signage at bicycle theft hotspots promoting good bicycle-locking habits, and deploying bait bicycles.

Findings and recommendations regarding TPD’s proactive crime prevention through enforcement of bicycle laws

Finding 18. The rate at which the TPD conducts bicycle stops is considerably higher in areas with relatively high crime rates (i.e., orange and red grids). The rates of bicycle stops in orange and red grids are more than five times greater than the rates of bicycle stops in unmarked grids (low crime areas) and twice as high as bicycle stops rate in yellow grids. This indicates that the TPD does in fact concentrate its use of bicycle stops in areas with crime problems.

Finding 19. The effect of bicycle stops on Part 1 crimes appears to be small, but our estimate is imprecise. Using the sharp reduction in bicycle stops after the TBT article was published as a natural experiment of the effect of bicycle stops on crime in Tampa, we find that the effect of this sharp reduction in bicycle stops is somewhere between an 8 percent drop in crime and an 18 percent increase in crime. Given this imprecise effect, the most conservative interpretation of this analysis is that the reduction in bicycle stops had no discernible effect on crime.

45 Johnson, Sidebottom, and Thorpe, Problem-Oriented Guides: Bicycle Theft.
**Recommendation 19.1.** While statistically bicycle stops and citations do not appear to have a notable effect on crime, the fact remains that in some cases criminals have been caught or deterred as a result of the bicycle stop and citation practice. Whether this is significant enough to implement a bicycle stop and citation practice should be revisited in the context of these findings and this report. At the same time, because using bicycle stops as a proactive policing strategy to reduce crime is fraught with fairness issues given the disproportionate number of Black bicyclists affected, the TPD and the City of Tampa must determine if the arguable benefits of the bicycle stops are or are not outweighed by the perceptions of unfairness because of the undeniably disproportionate Black citizens both directly affected and otherwise alienated by the process.

**Finding 20.** The community has mixed views on TPD bicycle stops, particularly why the TPD stops bicyclists and why the TPD picks some bicyclists but not others.

**Recommendation 20.1.** The TPD should articulate, in a manner consistent with their data, the reasons for the number and composition of the bicycle stops. Street checks have not been used to strategically implement bicycle safety efforts, nor do they seem to be an effective means for recovering stolen bicycles. Proactive policing appears to be the primary reason for bicycle stops. If the TPD intends to continue the pace of bicycle stops, then the TPD should (1) articulate the purpose for having a focus on bicycle street checks and citations while other Florida cities do not, (2) communicate to the public how proactive policing is consistent with a fair and effective crime prevention strategy, (3) make sure that officers in the field are conducting stops of the quality that TPD management intends, and (4) continue documentation of each street check and its connection to the crime prevention strategy.

**Recommendation 20.2.** The TPD should present each bicyclist stopped with a card listing what prompted the officer to stop that bicyclist. The card should note how the bicyclist can avoid getting stopped in the future (e.g., use a bicycle light or be home by curfew). The card should also list the officer’s badge number and supervisor’s contact information.

Should the TPD elect to reimplement the bicycle stop and citation practice or initiate any other anticrime strategy requiring enhanced interaction with citizens (and especially minorities), the processes discussed in this conclusion would minimize, drastically reduce, or altogether eliminate types of conduct that disrupt public trust in the police.
Resources


Team Biographies

Dr. Greg Ridgeway

Greg Ridgeway is the associate professor of Criminology and Statistics at the University of Pennsylvania. Ridgeway’s research involves the development and application of statistical methodologies for answering questions about crime and the criminal justice system, including guns, drug, policing, and fairness in the justice system.

Previously Dr. Ridgeway was the acting director of the National Institute of Justice, the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) science agency. He managed a staff of 80 employees and a budget of $250 million with a mission to improve the justice system by advancing research in social, physical, and forensic sciences. Prior to joining the DOJ, Ridgeway directed RAND’s Safety and Justice Research Program and RAND’s Center on Quality Policing, managing RAND’s portfolio of work on policing, crime prevention, courts, corrections, and public and occupational safety. He worked with the Oakland Police Department on racially biased policing analysis; with the Cincinnati Police Department during the collaborative agreement 2004–2009; and with the New York City Police Department in 2007 assessing bias in stop, question, and frisk.

Dr. Ridgeway is a fellow of the American Statistical Association (ASA) and in 2007 was recognized by the ASA for innovative analysis of policing issues. In 2005, he received a commendation from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ Los Angeles Field Division and the attorney general of California for "contributions to reducing firearms related crimes in Los Angeles." He is also an inventor on eight patents, the most recent granted in 2014. He received a PhD in statistics from the University of Washington, Seattle.

Dr. Ojmarrh Mitchell

Ojmarrh Mitchell is an associate professor and graduate director in the Department of Criminology at the University of South Florida. Mitchell earned his PhD in Criminal Justice and Criminology from the University of Maryland with a doctoral minor in Measurement, Statistics, and Evaluation. His research interests include race/ethnicity and crime, drugs and crime, courts and sentencing, systematic reviews of scientific research, and research methods. Mitchell’s past research includes a National Institute of Justice-funded meta-analysis of race and sentencing research, the National Evaluation of the Breaking the Cycle Demonstration Project (with Adele Harrell), the National Evaluation of Juvenile Correctional Facilities (with Doris L. MacKenzie), a randomized experimental evaluation of the Maryland Correctional Boot Camp (with Doris L. MacKenzie), and meta-analytic reviews of the effectiveness of drug courts and incarceration-based drug treatment in reducing recidivism (with David B. Wilson and Doris L. MacKenzie). In 2011, Mitchell was awarded the National Institute of Justice W.E.B. Du Bois Fellowship to study
Sheila Gunderman currently serves as director of programs for the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation (VCPI). She is responsible for managing the delivery of VCPI’s technical assistance engagements, program management endeavors, and training programs, including a growing catalog of more than 50 classroom and eLearn course offerings on current public safety topics. Since joining VCPI in 2004, she has managed more than 1100 training events, impacting nearly 40,000 law enforcement professionals and community stakeholders nationwide. Gunderman recruits, selects, and deploys a cadre of professional subject matter experts, instructors, and facilitators who represent VCPI in the national public safety community. Alongside the VCPI staff and these talented experts, Gunderman works closely with executives and training directors of law enforcement agencies to determine appropriate training programs and assistance plans to achieve their individual goals. She collaborates regularly with VCPI staff and consultants to develop program curriculum, both classroom-based and eLearning.

Ms. Gunderman has played an instrumental role in helping build and grow VCPI from a Virginia-specific, federally funded grant program into a nationwide service provider dedicated to advancing public safety, active in all U.S. states. Prior to joining VCPI, Gunderman worked as a high school Spanish teacher and dance instructor in Tampa, Florida. Her background also includes experience working in advertising and public relations firms both in Tampa and Charleston, South Carolina. She earned a bachelor of arts degree in Journalism and Mass Communications with specializations in advertising / public relations and Spanish from the University of South Carolina.

James Letten

James Letten is currently the assistant dean for Experiential Learning at Tulane Law School and is also of counsel for the law firm of Butler Snow LLP, where he represents primarily corporate clients. Prior to stepping down in December 2012, he had been the longest-serving U.S. attorney in the nation, serving on the attorney general's policy review panel on capital punishment, the attorney general's advisory committee, and subcommittees on Violent and Organized Crime, Terrorism and National Security, and Environmental Issues. He also served as the director of the National Center for Disaster Fraud.

Previously, as assistant U.S. attorney, Dean Letten served as lead counsel in the investigation, trial, and conviction of former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards. He led the DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Strike Force in New Orleans for over six years, and served over 20 years in the U.S. Naval Reserve. Dean Letten's awards include the attorney general's Medallion for racial/ethnic disparities in drug arrest and the effects of drug sanctions on subsequent drug offending and social bonding. Recently, he was appointed to the Office of Justice Program’s Science Advisory Board.
Distinguished Service for his leadership following Hurricane Katrina, the attorney general’s Award for Excellence in Litigation following the trial and conviction of the former Louisiana Governor, and the Anti-Defamation League’s 2010 Torch of Liberty Award for advancing civil rights.

Chief Cedric L. Alexander, PhD

Cedric Alexander has served as deputy chief operating officer, DeKalb County Office of Public Safety, since December 2013, and was previously chief of police for the DeKalb County Police Department. Chief Alexander is responsible for the day-to-day operations of DeKalb County Police/Fire Department, Medical Examiner’s Office, and Animal Services, as well as 911 Communications. Alexander is responsible for protecting and serving the 700,000 citizens of DeKalb County, the second largest county in the Metro-Atlanta area.

Prior to joining the DeKalb County Police Department, Chief Alexander served as federal security director for Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), deputy commissioner for the Office of Criminal Justice at the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services in Albany, and chief of police in Rochester, New York. He is the immediate past president of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives.

Chief Alexander holds a doctoral degree in clinical psychology from Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio, and has pursued postdoctoral training in the field at the University of Miami / Jackson Memorial Medical Center and the University of Rochester School of Medicine / Department of Psychiatry in Rochester, New York, as well as leadership training at Cornell University. He has published articles on police stress and burnout and currently lectures on topics of management and leadership. Alexander is also a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Training Committee and of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.
About the COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual respect between police and communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address our nation’s crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources.

Rather than simply responding to crime, community policing focuses on preventing it through strategic problem solving approaches based on collaboration. The COPS Office awards grants to hire community police and support the development and testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement.

Another source of COPS Office assistance is the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA). Developed to advance community policing and ensure constitutional practices, CRI-TA is an independent, objective process for organizational transformation. It provides recommendations based on expert analysis of policies, practices, training, tactics, and accountability methods related to issues of concern.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing.

- To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of approximately 127,000 additional officers by more than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than eight million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs.
- The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, roundtables, and other forums focused on issues critical to law enforcement.
The COPS Office information resources, covering a wide range of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—can be downloaded at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.
In response to a 2015 newspaper article reporting racial disparities in bicycle stops and citations, the Tampa Police Department (TPD) requested participation in the COPS Office Critical Response Initiative process to assess the allegations. A technical assistance team worked with the TPD through a comprehensive assessment process to conduct interviews and analyze data on bicycle stops, citations, crashes, and calls for service. The team determined that there were racial disparities in bicycle stops and that the patterns of stops were inconsistent with TPD’s stated aims of focusing on bicycle safety and bicycle theft. This report provides the findings and recommendations concerning TPD’s bicycle stops and citations.